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INTRODUCTION 
In the underlying case, an apartment complex, worth in excess of three million 
dollars, owned by Appellant's predecessor in interest, SHANGRI-LA GARDEN 
APARTMENTS and SHANGRI-LA APARTMENTS, Inc., a Nevada Corporation. 
(Hereinafter, SHANGRI-LA) was sold at a sheriffs sale for $8,000.00 to satisfy a 
$4,767.00 judgment. For reasons not relevant to this appeal, the judgment debtor did not 
redeem the property within the six-month redemption period. It subsequently filed an 
action to set aside the sheriffs sale and/or to extend the redemption period to avoid 
forfeiture of the multi-million dollar property. Shortly after the sheriffs sale, the 
purchaser quit-claimed its interest in the apartment, for $11,197.00, to UAW Properties, 
L.C. and DLM Investments, L.L.C.,(Hereinafter, UAW and DLM) which had been 
created to speculate on the property. SHANGRI-LA filed its action seeking to set aside 
the sheriffs sale and/or to extend the redemption period in Third District Court Case No 
970902686 QT. UAW and DLM responded contesting the setting aside of the sheriffs 
sale and extension of the redemption period and counterclaimed, asserting in part, 
conversion and the right to impose the Utah Unlawful Detainer Act. At trial, SHANGRI-
LA was represented by Shawn Turner of the firm of LARSEN, KIRKHAM & TURNER 
(Hereinafter, Turner). UAW AND DLM were represented by Steven B. Mitchell of 
BIRBIDGE & MITCHELL (Hereinafter, Mitchell). The matter was heard at a two day 
bench trial before the Honorable Frank G. Noel, District Judge. SHANGRI-LA, as 
represented by Turner, did not contest the application of the Utah Unlawful Detainer Act, 
either in the framing of the issues by the pleadings or at trial, up to the completion of 
presentation of evidence and final argument. At final argument of the matter, the trial 
court asked Mitchell to specify what he was claiming on his counterclaim. Mitchell 
answered that his claim included a claim for unlawful detainer comprised of damages 
equal to the rents received on the apartments from the time of the unlawful detainer until 
the action was filed, which rents were stipulated to be $304,333.00 and which damages 
should be trebled according to the Unlawful Detainer Act. The court asked Turner for his 
response to Mitchell's claim for damages equal to the received rents, wherein Turner in 
effect agreed with Mitchell's claim. The trial court entered its Memorandum Decision on 
May 5, 1998, which in page five thereof, recited that the court felt the parties had not 
adequately addressed the issue of treble damages and requested briefing of the issue. In 
his brief on the issue, Turner, for the first time, argued that the Unlawful Detainer Statute 
did not apply. Turner did not at any time raise the argument that the rule governing 
redemption, Rule 69 (j) (3) and (7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Paragraph (j)(3) limits 
what fees a buyer at sheriffs sale can collect in a redemption situation; paragraph (j)(7) 
limits the application of rents from redeemed property to a credit upon redemption money 
to be paid. 
The trial court entered judgment awarding damages for unlawful detainer of 
$304,333.00, which damages the court trebled according to the unlawful detainer statute; 
thus, establishing a redemption amount of nearly one million dollars. SHANGRI-LA 
retained new counsel and filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court's decision. 
Possession of the apartment complex was turned over to UAW and DLM. Almost 
immediately, the apartments began to suffer from inept management and inadequate 
maintenance, to the degree that the property began to suffer diminution in value by reason 
of the effect of the inept management, inadequate maintenance and the effect of a fire that 
occurred in one of the apartment buildings, damage from which was not seasonably 
repaired. SHANGRI-LA was not able to raise the nearly one million dollar redemption 
fee. SHANGRI-LA was advised by its new counsel that disposition of the appeal could 
take an additional two or three years. To be able to re-take possession of the apartment 
complex and eliminate the diminution in value being experienced, and to mitigate its 
damages, SHANGRI-LA negotiated a settlement of the matter with UAW and DLM, 
which included a dismissal with prejudice of the appeal after briefing thereof, but prior to 
the determination of the appeal. Plaintiffs in this action, successors in interest to 
SHANGRI-LA, then brought this action. (The apartment complex mentioned, was 
transferred to Crestwood Cove Apartments Business Trust, a Utah Business Trust after 
the occurrence above outlined, but to avoid confusion, the successor in interest, 
Crestwood Cove Apartments Business Trust will continue to be referred to as SHANGRI-
LA.) 
JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
This court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of §78-2a-3 (j) 
Utah Code Ann. (1996) (Cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme 
Court). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
SHANGRI-LA alleges that Turner failed to contest the application of the Utah 
Unlawful Detainer Act, §78-36-3; Treble damage provisions, §78-36-10, Utah Code 
Ann., prior to the completion of evidence and final argument and failed to raise the 
appropriate provisions of Rule 69 (j), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as limiting the 
amount that could be legitimately assessed as part of the redemption fee. Turner's failure 
resulted in the improper assessment of a redemption fee of nearly one million dollars, a 
fee SHANGRI-LA did not have. SHANGRI-LA, alleges that to mitigate its damages and 
eliminate the continuing diminution of value of the apartment complex, it negotiated a 
settlement agreement with UAW and DLM, and as a part thereof, dismissed its appeal of 
the trial court's ruling, prior to determination of the appeal. 
1. Did the trial court err in finding that Turner's conduct did not constitute 
malpractice or malpractice per se. 
2. If Turner's conduct constituted malpractice, was such malpractice the proximate 
cause of SHANGRI-LA's incurring a redemption fee of nearly one million dollars 
and was such malpractice the proximate cause of SHANGRI-LA being placed in 
the situation of having to settle with UAW and DLM where it paid one hundred 
thousand dollars, abandoned fire insurance proceeds, lost rent paid to UAW and 
DLM, and had to accept the return of severely damaged apartments. 
3. Did SHANGRI-LA, by settling the matter and dismissing its appeal prior to 
determination of said appeal, forfeit its right to pursue a malpractice action against 
Turner. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
AND PRESENTATION 
1. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment the facts are reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the losing party and no deference is given to the trial court's legal 
conclusions. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and all other 
submissions show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Swift Stop Inc. v. Wight, 
845 P.2d250, 250 (UtahApp 1992) Atkinson v. IHC Hospitals, Inc. 798 P.2d 
73 3, 734 (Utah 1990) Ordinarily, whether a defendant has breached the required 
standard of care is a question of fact for the jury. Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 
613, 615 (Utah 1982) 
This issue was preserved below and was raised in SHANGRI-LA's memorandum 
opposition to Turner's motion for summary judgment. (R. at 80, 86, 87 ) 
2. Proximate cause is an issue of fact and only if there is no evidence upon which a 
reasonable jury could infer causation, is summary judgment appropriate. Swift 
Stop, Inc. v. Wight. Id 
This issue was preserved below. (Affidavit of Stanley Wade, and SHANGRI- LA's 
memorandum in opposition to Turner's motion for summary judgment. 
R. at 76-78, 87, 89-91) 
3. The question of whether SHANGRI-LA's action of settlement of its suit with 
UAW and DLM prior to determination of appeal constituted a waiver of its right to 
pursue a malpractice action against Turner is a question of law, in a review of 
which the appellate court will afford the trial court's decision no deference but 
will review it for correctness. See Onglntl (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave Corp., 850 
P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993) 
The issue was preserved below in that it was the primary issue argued in Turner's 
motion for summary judgment and the trial court specifically found that 
SHANGRI-LA had forfeited its right to pursue a malpractice action against Turner 
in the Order Granting Summary Judgment. (R. at 35 -39, 80 -87 ) 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
1. Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. ( Set forth in Addendum 1 ) 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3 (1996) ( Set forth in Addendum 2 ) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. SHANGRI-LA retained Turner to represent its interest in the matter involved in 
the sheriffs sale of the apartment complex known as Shangri-la Garden 
Apartments, ultimately, to UAW and DLM. Turner appeared as counsel on 
January 28, 1998. SHANGRI-LA had earlier been involved in small claims court 
actions that ultimately resulted in judgment against SHANGRI-LA for costs and 
attorney's fees in the amount of $4,767.00. The amount was not paid, the property 
was set for sheriffs sale and after a botched attempt to pay the amount due prior to 
sale, was sold for $8,000.00 to Kasey Enterprises, Inc, on August 27, 1996. UAW 
and DLM purchased the; interest of Kasey Enterprises, Inc. for $11,000.00. 
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SHANGRI-LA did not redeem the property within the 6 month redemption period 
set forth in Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. UAW and DLM served a 
notice to quit on April 16, 1997 and on April 18, 1997, SHANGRI-LA filed an 
action in Third District Court seeking quiet title to the property and an order 
setting aside the sheriffs sale or in the alternative, an order extending the time for 
redemption. UAW and DLM counterclaimed for unlawful detainer and conversion. 
A two day trial was held on April 13 and 14, 1999. 
The trial court entered its memorandum decision on May 5, 1998 in which it 
extended the redemption period, determined that UAW and DLM were entitled to 
return of their purchase price plus attorney's fees and taxes paid on the property 
along with rents received on the property from the time of purchase until time of 
trial, an amount of $304,333.00. The trial court felt that the matter of treble 
damages had not been sufficiently briefed, and requested the parties to brief the 
question of treble damages. After receiving said briefs, the trial court imposed a 
redemption fee including rents of $304,333.00 trebled to the amount of 
$912,999.00. (See Addendum 3 ) 
Turner filed a brief in response to the trial courts request therefore, in which he for 
the first time, argued that the provisions of the unlawful detainer act did not apply. 
He did not argue the redemption fee limitations of Rule 69(j), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure would limit the amount of redemption fee that could be legitimately 
imposed. (See Addendum 4 ) 
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SHANGRI-LA timely filed its notice of appeal in the matter on November, 17, 
1998. The appeal progressed to the point of appellant filing its brief on appeal and 
appellee filing its brief on appeal, having been completed on or about March 24, 
2000. (See Addendum 5 ) 
During the time UAW and DLM had possession of the property, the properly was 
neglected and by reason of lax screening, the quality of tenants declined leading to 
more frequent non-payment of rents. There was a fire in one of the apartment 
buildings, resulting in substantial damage, which was repaired only to the extent of 
closing holes in the roof to keep water out, the property was not repaired to the 
state of being habitable for new tenants. Money from the coin operated machines 
on the premises was collected but not used to pay obligations, resulting in liens 
being filed against the property. Proper maintenance was not being done. Damage 
was not timely repaired. All of the foregoing, resulted in diminution of value of the 
property. (Affidavit of Stanley Wade Addendum 6 ) 
By reason of the aforestated problems, SHANGRI-LA made a business decision to 
settle the matter with UAW and DLM in order to be able to re-take possession of 
the property and to be able to resolve the problems outlined above and reverse the 
ongoing diminution in value of the property attributable to the flawed management 
of said property. The matter was settled on or about October 6, 2000 by a 
settlement agreement that provided, inter alia for the dismissal with prejudice of 
the appeal. On October 6, 2000, the Utah Supreme Court granted a voluntary 
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dismissal of appeal with prejudice, based on the stipulation of the parties therefore. 
(See Addendum 6 ) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court found there were no contested issues of fact in this matter, allowing 
it to rule as a matter of law that there was no malpractice committed by Turner. Prior to 
and at trial, Turner did not bring to the court's attention, the provisions of Rule 69 (j) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which rule states with specificity in subparagraphs (3) and 
(7) what cost items shall be assessed in calculating a redemption fee and how any rents 
are to be treated. Neither did he bring to the court's attention and argue in an effective 
and timely manner the language of the unlawful detainer statute that limits the application 
of such statute to tenant and landlord disputes. The dispute involved in that matter was a 
title dispute, which was not brought to the court's attention. An attorney's conduct with 
regard to whether or not he meets the required standard of care, is a question of fact. It is 
the duty of a competent attorney to bring pertinent and relevant law to the courts 
attention. Failure to do so is malpractice. Turner's failure to meet the required standard of 
care was the proximate cause of SHANGRI-LA's being assessed a redemption fee of 
nearly one million dollars and being placed in the position of having to settle with UAW 
and DLM, to mitigate its damages, and to its detriment. Proximate cause is a question of 
fact. The lower court's finding that SHANGRI-LA had forfeited its right to pursue a 
malpractice action against Turner when it settled the matter before determination of the 
appeal taken fro Judge Noel's ruling was error. Where its counsel's deficient conduct 
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places a party in the position of having to settle a matter before final determination of an 
appeal, to minimize its losses, that party is not compelled to forgo its right to seek redress 
for malpractice. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THERE WERE NO 
CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT RELATING TO THE QUESTION 
OF ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE. 
An attorney has a duty to use such skill, prudence and diligence as lawyers of 
ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance of the 
tasks which they undertake. Williams b. Barber, 765 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1988) (quoting 
Lucase v. Hamm, 56 Cal2d 583, 15 Car.Rptr. 821, 825, 364 P.2d 685, 689 (1961) cert. 
denied, 368 U.S. 987, 82 S.Ct. 603, 7 L.Ed.2d 525 (1962) In the underlying case, there 
were two critical issues raised by the pleadings. First, SHANGRI-LA raised, inter alia, 
the issue of equitable redemption of the property. Redemption is governed by Rule 69 (j), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Subparagraph (1), (2), (4), (5) and(6) set forth who may 
redeem, how redemption is made, subsequent redemptions, notice of redemption and 
certificate of redemption or conveyance. As regards this case, the two critical provisions 
relating to redemptions are subparagraphs (3) and (7). Subparagraph (3), in pertinent part 
states: 
(3) Time for redemption; amount to be paid. The property may be redeemed . . 
. . .by paying the amount of the purchase with a surcharge of 6 percent thereon 
in addition, together with the amount of any assessment or taxes, and any 
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reasonable sum for fire insurance and necessary maintenance, upkeep or repair of 
any improvements upon the property which the purchaser may have paid thereon 
after the purchase, with interest at the lawful rate on such other amounts, . . . 
Subparagraph (7) says, in pertinent part 
(7) Rents during period of redemption. The purchaser from the time of sale until 
a redemption, and a redemptioner from the time of redemption until another 
redemption, is entitled to receive from any tenant in possession the rents of the 
property sold or the value of the use and occupation thereof. But when any rents or 
profits have been received by the judgment creditor or purchaser, or their assigns, 
from the property thus sold preceding such redemption, the amounts of such rents 
and profits shall be a credit upon the redemption money to be paid . . . 
The above provisions therefore then state that in a redemption situation, such as the one 
at bar, the amount to be paid by the redemptioner, should have been the amount paid by 
the purchaser at purchase of the property, in this case, $11,000.00 plus 6 percent, plus 
any amount paid for taxes by the purchaser, plus any amount paid for fire insurance and 
necessaiy maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any improvement on the property, plus 
interest at the lawful rate on any amount paid for the last five items. (The record is silent 
as to whether UAW and DLM paid any amount other than the purchase price of 
$11,000.00) A redemption fee calculated according to the requirements of the rule, would 
have been less than $20,000.00 - far shy of the nearly one million dollars imposed by the 
court. Any rents involved should have only been used to pay the appropriate redemption 
fee, any excess to go to the property owner, or redemptioner. The trial court was never 
presented with the application and language of Rule 69 (j) by SHANGRI-LA's counsel. If 
the provisions of said rule had been presented in a timely manner at trial, it is difficult to 
see how the trial court could have ignored the rule's provisions to reach the ruling it did. 
11 
It is elemental that a lawyer, using such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of 
ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise is or becomes aware of 
provisions of the law that so obviously apply to his case. SHANGRI-LA as part of its suit 
was seeking the right to redeem the property. One seeking redemption as a remedy should 
certainly know and argue the law that governs such remedy. This omission was clearly a 
breach of the required standard of care. " . . . whether a defendant has breached the 
required standard of care is a question of fact for the jury." Harline v. Barker 854 P.2d 
595, 599 (Utah App. 1993) 
The second issue of importance relates to the claim by UAW and DLM, to be 
entitled to relief for unlawful detainer, Utah Code Ann. 1996, § 78-36-3. Unlawful 
detainer by tenant for term less than life. (Emphasis added) The language of the statute 
states in its first paragraph: "(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is 
guilty of an unlawful detainer: . . ." (Emphasis added) The statute clearly on its face 
applies only to landlord - tenant disputes. The cases annotated under the statute clearly 
apply only to 'tenants'. The dispute between UAW and DLM and SHANGRI-LA was a 
dispute over TITLE to real property, not a dispute over tenancy. The application of the 
statute was not contested by SHANGRI-LA's counsel until after the court had made its 
decision wherein it granted UAW and DLM damage relief under the statute. (See the trial 
courts memorandum decision, Addendum 3 ) The court only wanted additional briefing 
from the parties on whether to treble such damages or not. The court obviously had 
decided to bestow on UAW and DLM the benefit of the unlawful detainer statute. This 
too, constitutes a breach of the standard of care and is a question of fact for the jury to 
decide. 
2. Turner's conduct constituted malpractice, and such malpractice was the 
proximate cause of SHANGRI-LA being burdened with a redemption 
fee of nearly one million dollars, losing possession of the apartment 
complex and being placed in the position of being forced to mitigate its 
damages by settling, to its detriment, with UAW and DLM. Causation is 
a question of fact for the jury to decide. 
SHANGRI-LA has alleged itself to have been damaged by Turner's failure to meet 
the required standard of care of an attorney, thus raising the issue of causation. If Turner 
had brought the law with regard to the redemption fee and the law regarding unlawful 
detainer to the courts attention in a timely manner, the court would have knowingly had 
to rule contrary to the law to rule as it did. Turner did not do so, and the court's ruling 
was extremely prejudicial to SHANGRI-LA. Turner's failure to meet the standard of care 
caused the detriment to SHANGRI-LA. "Proximate cause is an issue of fact. . .Thus, only 
if there is no evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer causation, is summary 
judgment appropriate. Swift Stop, Inc. v. Wight 845 P. 2d 250, 253 (UtahApp. 1992) 
"The client must show that if the attorney had adhered to the ordinary standards of 
professional competence and had done the act he failed to do or not done the act 
complained about, the client would have benefited." Young v. Bridwell, 20 Utah 2d 332, 
437 P.2d 686, 690 (1968) Again, such a showing relies on the facts, the facts regarding 
the issue are contested and therefore not appropriate for summary disposition. 
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3, Under the facts of this case, it was error for the trial court to find 
that SHANGRI-LA had forfeited its right to pursue a malpractice 
action against Turner. 
There appear to be no Utah cases that address this issue. However, there are cases 
from other jurisdictions which have considered the question of when and how a party can 
forfeit a right to pursue counsel for malpractice. Turner, in his motion to the trial court 
and addressing the situation where a parties counsel had acted in such a manner as to give 
the party a claim to having been damaged by malpractice, cited Legal Malpractice §21.16 
(5th Ed. 2000), Mallen and Smith in its statement: "if the compromise prevented the 
judicial lesolution of issues that would have established that the attorney was not 
negligent or a cause of the client's loss, then the attorney should not be liable." They 
went on to cite two Florida cases, Segal v. Segall, 632 So. 2d 76 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993) and 
Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Association v. Sikes, 590 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. Ct. App. 
1991) as precedent Both Sikes and Segal involved fact situations in which the attorneys 
who were sued for malpractice, committed no negligence in their conduct at trial, yet the 
courts rulings were adverse to their client's interests. In each case, there was a substantial 
question of judicial error, which was not caused by the attorney's conduct. In each case, 
the clients appealed the result and then settled the cases before the appeals were heard 
and then sued their respective attorneys for malpractice. Their settlement of the cases 
before ruling on the appeals thereby prevented the appellate court from reversing the trial 
court's error, and vindicating their attorneys actions at trial. The appellate courts in the 
malpractice actions ruled in both cases that by settling the underlying cases before 
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appellate determination, the clients had abandoned or waived their claims against their 
attorneys. The distinction between the Florida cases and the instant case is that in this 
matter, there was substantial negligent conduct by Turner which allowed the trial court to 
decide against SHANGRI-LA on the issues of damage and unlawful detainer. The result 
being that the trial court ruled, in error, that the Wrongful Detainer Act applied to the 
underlying case and to err in failing to applythe provisions of Rule 69 (j) (3) and (7), 
provisions of which limit the cost items to be included in the redemption fee and specify 
how rents are to be treated if they were included in the scenario. Of interest is the Court's 
final comment in Segal,: "We are unable to establish a bright-line rule that complete 
appellate review of the underlying litigation is a condition precedent to every legal 
malpractice action. To do so would, in many cases, violate the tenet that the law will not 
require the performance of useless acts." 
UAW and DLM claimed relief under the Wrongful Detainer Act and asked for an 
award of compensation that was not provided for in Rule 69 (j) (3) and (7) early on in 
their case and Turner did not object to the claim for relief under wrongful detainer until 
after the trial court entered its memorandum decision, and never did argue the limitations 
of Rule 69 At final argument, the following dialogue took place: 
The Court: (Addressing Mr. Turner) —le t me ask you this question. Even if I 
were to allow you to redeem, if I were to accept your equitable 
redemption argument, defendant's claim that they're still entitled to 
rents of $304,000 since the unlawful detainer. What is your response 
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to that? 
Mr. Turner: Our answer would be, your Honor, that they would be entitled to 
rents from the period they filed the unlawful detainer until such time 
as this action was brought. ( R. at 98 ) 
Mr. Turner did not dispute the claim of UAW and DLM to the rents, treble damages, and 
attorney's fees, until after the case had been tried, the parties had given their final 
argument and rested. 
Turner has cited the case of Sutherlandv. Milstein, 266A.D.2d33, 608 N.YS.2.d 
15; (1999 N. Y. App. Div) which case involved a fact situation in which defendant 
attorneys represented plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action which was settled. The 
plaintiffs sued their attorneys for malpractice. The appellate court dismissed the appeal 
finding that the adult plaintiffs claim was time barred and the second plaintiffs claim 
survived by reason of infancy toll but was properly dismissed because the adult plaintiff 
controlled the settlement. The court noted that plaintiff did not allege their attorney's 
negligence forced them to settle. In the instant case, the defendant's negligence did force 
plaintiff to settle with UAW and DLM to avoid ongoing and accelerating damage. 
Likewise, the case of Cozza v. Steuer 694 N.E.2d 1376 (Ohio App. 8 Dist 1997) is cited 
as authority to preclude suit where the underlying case is settled prior to determination on 
appeal. The facts are somewhat complicated, but basically involve an employer hiring 
attorneys to resist an age discrimination suit by an employee. The employee prevailed, 
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the employer appealed, settled before the appeal was heard and sued its attorneys for 
malpractice. The Steuer court dismissed the legal malpractice action but in doing so 
stated: 
We do not suggest that a settlement of the underlying action always operates as a 
waiver of a client's malpractice claim against his attorney. A settlement entered 
into as a result of an attorney's exercise of reasonable judgment in handling a case 
bars a malpractice claim against the attorney. DePugh v. Sladjoe (1996) 111 Ohio 
App.3d675, 676N.E.2d 1231. However, a legal malpractice claim is not barred 
when the attorney has acted unreasonably or has committed malpractice per 
se. Id "[W]hen an attorney has made an obvious error which seriously 
compromises his client's claim, and a settlement is on the table * * * the client 
should not be forced to forgo the settlement offer as a condition of pursuing the 
attorney for malpractice. (Emphasis added) Id. See, also, Monastra v. D 'Amore 
(1996) 111 Ohio App. 3d 296, 676N.E.2d 132 (where attorney's defective 
representation diminishes client's ability to reach a successful settlement or to 
succeed at trial, the settlement of the action should not imply a waiver of client's 
right to file legal malpractice action against the attorney). 
Mr. Turner's failure to contest critical issues prior to and at trial created the scenario that 
placed Plaintiffs in a no-win situation. 
For a plaintiff to prevail in a legal malpractice action, it must prove five elements: 
"(i) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (ii) a duty of the attorney to the client 
arising from their relationship; (iii) a breach of that duty; (iv) a causal connection 
between the breach of the duty and the resulting injury to the client; and (v) actual 
damages." Harline v. Barker 912 P. 2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996), as cited in Glencore, LTD. 
v. Ince 972 P.2d 376 (Utah 1998). The Ince Court goes on to note that a malpractice 
action presents a "case within a case". The objective is to establish what the result [of the 
underlying litigation] should have been, (an objective standard), not what a particular 
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judge or jury would have decided (a subjective standard.) The court takes this language, 
(paraphrased, above) from 2 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffery M. Smith, legal malpractice 
§27.7 at 641-42 (3d ed 1989) SHANGRI-LA asserts the position that in light of the above 
statement of law, it is also appropriate to establish what the result of underlying litigation 
should have been and not what the trial judge erroneously did decide, (i.) There can be no 
doubt that there was an attorney-client relationship between Plaintiffs and Defendants, 
(ii.) From the attorney-client relationship arise several duties, one of which is set forth in 
Rule 1.1 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct which requires: "A lawyer shall 
provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal 
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation." (iii.) The demonstrated unfamiliarity with and failure to timely raise the 
inapplicability of the Unlawful Detainer Statute and the appropriate provisions of Rule 69 
(j) (3) and (7) constitute a breach of the afore stated duty and suggest that the Defendants 
were negligent in failing to undertake reasonable legal research about the issue, (iv.) The 
breach of that duty placed the SHANGRI-LA in a no-win situation where IT was forced 
either endure the ongoing damage and diminution in value to the apartment complex 
under the despotic stewardship of UAW and DLM until their appeal was heard and 
decided, which could have been two or more years down the road, or to settle the matter 
with UAW and DLM to cut off the damage and diminution in value to the property. 
(v.)The Plaintiffs were damaged by having to pay $100,000 to UAW and DLM, abandon 
the fire insurance proceeds, loose the rent paid to UAW and DLM, and to accept the 
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return of severely damaged apartments that required much repair. 
The case of Watkis & Saperstein v. Williams 931 P.2d840 (Utah 1996) is 
applicable. That case involved allegations of negligence where Watkiss & Saperstein 
were alleged to have committed negligence in a case where they missed a statute of 
limitations. However, the law in the District of Columbia was unsettled and uncertain as 
it regarded the event tolling a statute of limitations in their particular situation. Watkiss & 
Saperstein chose the wrong date as determined by an appellate court decision handed 
down after the fact resulting in their client being out of court on the issue. In ruling on 
their case in the malpractice action brought as a result thereof, the Utah Supreme Court 
noted, inter alia, that "To qualify for immunity from liability for the consequences of an 
eiToneous legal interpretation of unsettled and uncertain law, most courts demand that 
lawyers perform the research and investigation necessary to make an informed judgment. 
See, e.g., Smith v. Lewis 13Cal.3d349, 118 CalRptr 621, 530 P.2d589 (1975). This is so 
the lawyer will follow the best and most logical interpretation out of a number of 
reasonable interpretations. SeeMallen & Smith § 17.6 at 507-08, § 17.17, at 543." Noting 
that a lawyer is not required to anticipate changes in the law, the Supreme Court affirmed 
the trial courts dismissal of the action against Watkiss & Saperstein. The whole point of 
citing this case and the holdings thereof, is to highlight the obligation of counsel to know 
the law involved in the issues of a case he undertakes, and if he does not know the law, 
then he is obligated to learn the law, and to do so before trial on the matter. Otherwise he 
does not fulfill his duty of competent representation to the client he represents. 
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Once an attorney-client relationship is established, the attorney's duty is to "'use 
such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly 
possess and exercise in the performance of tasks which they undertake/" Williams v. 
Barber, 765 P. 2d 887, 889 (Utah 1988). The Williams Court also states that". . . counsel 
is required to undertake the research which a reasonable attorney under the circumstances 
would do. Id. Accord Williams, 765 P. 2d at 889. " Ordinarily, whether a defendant has 
breached the required standards of care is a question of fact for the jury. Consequently, a 
motion for summary judgment should be denied where the evidence presents a genuine 
issue of material fact which, if resolved in favor of the non-moving party, would entitle 
him to a judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue of fact exists where, on the basis of 
the facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ on whether defendant's conduct 
measures up to the required standard." Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P. 2d 613, 615 ( Utah 
1982). 
CONCLUSION 
Turner owed a duty to the client to not undertake representation regarding an area 
of the law in which he did not have the such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of 
ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance of tasks 
which they undertake. Lucas v. Hamm 56 Cal.2d583f 15 Cal.Rptr. 821, 825, 364 P. 2d 
685, 689 (1961) cert. Denied, 368 U.S. 987, 82 S.Ct. 603, 7L.Ed2d525 (1962). It has 
been recognized that a lawyer may undertake a case involving issues of law in which he 
is not cognizant or knowledgeable, if he is able to develop the cognizance or knowledge 
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in time to meet his duty to the client. The Defendants failure to be able to meet and deal 
with the issue of the Wrongful Detainer Statute and the elements of Rule 69 (j) (3) and 
(7) at trial constitutes a breach of that duty. But for Turner's failure to meet the correct 
standard of care, SHANGRI-LA would not have been placed in a position where it was 
forced to settle with UAW and DLM prior to the hearing of its appeal, to mitigate its 
damages and prevent further damage and diminution of value of the apartment complex. 
Most of the foregoing issues are questions of fact. The cases cited by Turner which were 
found to defeat a malpractice claim by the client against his attorney, were cases in which 
the attorney's conduct was not questionable, but the result was. They did not involve 
cases in which the attorney missed or failed to address critical issues, which proximately 
caused the client's injury and damage. There are disputed issues of material fact in this 
matter that preclude summary judgment and the grant of summary judgment should be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this J?day of (2?rsf , 2004. 
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Rule 69. Execution and proceedings supplemental thereto. 
(a) Availability of writ of execution. A writ of execution is available to a 
judgment creditor to satisfy a judgment or otber order requiring the delivery 
of property or the payment of money by a judgment debtor. 
(b) Property subject to execution. A writ of execution may be used to 
levy upon all of the judgment debtor's personal property and real property 
which is not exempt from execution under state or federal law. 
(c) Issuance of writ of execution. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, 
a writ of execution may be issued at any time within eight years following the 
entry of a judgment or order (except an execution may be stayed pursuant to 
Rule 62), either in the county in which such judgment was rendered, or in any 
county in which a transcript thereof has been filed and docketed in the office 
of the clerk of the district court. Notwithstanding the death of a party after 
judgment, execution thereon may be issued, or such judgment may be en-
forced, as follows: 
(1) In case of the death of the judgment creditor, upon the application of 
an authorized executor or administrator, or successor in interest. 
(2) In case of the death of the judgment debtor, if the judgment is for 
the recovery of real or personal property or the enforcement of a lien 
thereon. 
(d) Contents of writ and to whom it may be directed. The writ of exe-
cution shall be issued in the name of the State of Utah, and subscribed by the 
clerk of the court. It shall be issued to the sheriff or constable of any county in 
the state (and may be issued at the same time to different counties) but where 
it requires the delivery of possession or sale of real property, it shall be issued 
to the sheriff of the county where the real property or some part thereof is 
situated. If it requires delivery of possession or sale of personal property, it 
may be issued to a constable. It must intelligibly refer to the judgment, stat-
ing the court, the docket number, the county where the same is entered or 
docketed, the names of the parties, the judgment, and, if it is for the payment 
of money, the amount thereof, and the amount actually due thereon. The writ 
may be accompanied by a praecipe executed by the judgment creditor or the 
judgment creditor's counsel generally or specifically describing the real or 
personal property to be levied upon. It shall be directed to the sheriff of the 
county in which it is to be executed in cases involving real property, and shall 
require the officer to proceed in accordance with the terms of the writ; pro-
vided that if such writ is against the property of the judgment debtor gener-
ally it may direct the sheriff or constable to satisfy the judgment, with inter-
est, out of the non-exempt personal property of the debtor, and if sufficient 
non-exempt personal property cannot be found, then the sheriff shall satisfy 
the judgment, with interest, out of the judgment debtor's non-exempt real 
property. 
(e) When writ to be returned. The writ of execution shall be served at 
any time within sixty days after its receipt by the officer. It shall then be 
returned to the court from which it issued, and when it is returned the clerk 
must attach it to the record. 
(f) Service of the writ Unless the execution otherwise directs, the officer 
must execute the writ against the non-exempt property of the judgment 
debtor by levying on a sufficient amount of property, if there is sufficient 
property; collecting or selling the choses in action and selling the other prop-
erty in the manner set forth herein. Levy includes the seizure of the property 
and holding the property in person or through one or more agents, including 
the judgment debtor, appointed by the officer. When there is more property of 
the judgment debtor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and accruing 
costs within view of the officer, the officer must levy only on such part of the 
property as the judgment debtor may indicate, if the property indicated is 
amply sufficient to satisfy the judgment and costs. 
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When an officer has served an execution issued out of any court the officer 
may complete the return thereof after such date of service. 
(g) Notice to judgment debtor of sale and of exempt property and 
right to a hearing. At the time the writ of execution is issued, the clerk shall 
attach to the writ a notice of execution and exemptions and right to a hearing 
and two copies of an application by which the judgment debtor may request a 
hearing. 
Upon service of the writ, the sheriff or constable shall serve upon the judg-
ment debtor, in the same manner as service of a summons in a civil action, or 
cause to be transmitted by both regular and certified mail, returned receipt 
requested, to the judgment debtor's last known address as provided by the 
judgment creditor, (i) the notice of execution and exemptions and right to a 
hearing, and (ii) the application by which the judgment debtor may request a 
hearing. Upon service of the writ, the sheriff or constable may also set the 
date of sale or delivery and serve upon the judgment debtor notice of the date 
and time of sale or delivery in the same manner as service of the notice of 
execution and exemptions and right to a hearing. 
The notice of execution and exemptions that is to be served upon the judg-
ment debtor shall indicate in substance that certain property is or may be 
exempt from execution including but not limited to a homestead; tools of the 
trade; a motor vehicle used for the judgment debtor's business or profession; 
social security benefits; supplemental security income benefits; veterans' ben-
efits; unemployment benefits; workers' compensation benefits; public assis-
tance (welfare); alimony; child support; certain pensions; part or all of wages 
or other earnings from personal services; certain furnishings and appliances; 
musical instruments; and heirlooms (each not to exceed the amount allowed 
by law). The notice shall also indicate that the list is a partial list and other 
various property exemptions may be available under federal law or the Utah 
exemptions statute, and that the judgment debtor must request a hearing 
within ten (10) days from the date of service of the notice upon the judgment 
debtor. For purposes of this provision, the date of service shall be the date of 
mailing, if mailed, or date of delivery, if hand-delivered, and no period for 
mailing under Rule 6(e) shall be used in computing the time period. 
If the writ, the notice of execution and exemptions and right to a hearing 
cannot be served upon the judgment debtor in the same manner as service of a 
summons in a civil action, and the judgment creditor does not have available 
the judgment debtor's last known address, only the following notice need be 
published under the caption of the case in a newspaper of general circulation 
in each county in which the property levied upon, or some part thereof, is 
situated: 
TO , Judgment Debtor: 
A writ of execution has been issued in the above-captioned case, di-
rected to the sheriff or constable of County, com-
manding the sheriff or constable as follows: 
"WHEREAS, [Quoting body of writ of execu-
tion]." 
YOU MAY HAVE A RIGHT TO EXEMPT PROPERTY from the sale 
under statutes of the United States or this state, including Utah Code 
Annotated, Title 78, Chapter 23, in the manner described in those stat-
utes. 
The date of publication shall be deemed the date of service and the date of 
publication shall be not less than ten (10) days prior to the date of sale or 
delivery. 
This paragraph (g) shall not be applicable to judicial mortgage foreclosure 
proceedings commenced under Utah Code Annotated, Title 78, Chapter 37. 
(h) Request for hearing. 
/..N m . — j? „——j. rpu^ UnAr~~r>~t rUkfr^ nr PTW nther nerson who 
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owns or claims an interest in the property subject to execution may re-
quest a hearing to claim any exemption to the execution, or to challenge 
the issuance of the writ Such request must be filed or served upon the 
judgment creditor or the attorney for the judgment creditor within ten 
(10) days of the service upon the judgment debtor of the materials re-
quired to be served by paragraph (g) upon the judgment debtor. The 
request for a hearing, which shall be provided to the judgment debtor 
shall be in a form to enable the judgment debtor to specify the grounds 
upon which the judgment debtor challenges the issuance of the writ or 
claims the property executed upon to be exempt, in whole or in part. 
(2) If a request for hearing is filed. If a request for hearing is filed 
by or on behalf of the judgment debtor, the court shall set the matter for 
hearing within ten (10) days from the filing of the request and serve 
notice of that hearing upon all parties by first class mail. If the court 
determines at the hearing that the writ was issued improperly, or that 
any property seized is exempt from or is not subject to execution, the court 
shall immediately issue an order to the officer releasing such property or 
portion thereof from the writ of execution. If the court finds that the 
property or a portion thereof is subject to execution and not exempt, it 
shall issue an order directing the officer to proceed with the sale of the 
non-exempt property subject to execution. If the originally scheduled date 
of sale for which notice has been given has passed, notice of the new date 
and time of sale shall be provided as required herein. No sale may be held 
until the Court has decided upon the issues presented at the hearing. At 
the hearing, the court may award costs as it deems appropriate. 
(3) If no request for hearing is filed. If a request for hearing is not 
filed as provided for in this Rule and the time for doing so has expired, 
then the officer shall proceed to sell or deliver the property subject to 
execution in accordance with the writ and this Rule 69. 
(4) This paragraph (h) shall not be applicable to judicial mortgage fore-
closure proceedings commenced under Utah Code Annotated, Title 78, 
Chapter 37. 
(i) Proceedings on sale of property. 
(1) Notice of sale. Before the sale of the property on execution notice 
thereof must be given as follows: (A) in case of perishable property or 
animals, by posting written notice of the time and place of sale, and 
generally describing the property to be sold, in the district courthouse and 
in at least three other public places of the county or city where the sale is 
to take place, for such a time as may be reasonable, considering the 
character and condition of the property; (B) in case of other personal 
property, by posting written notice of the time and place of sale, and 
generally describing the property to be sold, in the district courthouse and 
in at least three public places of the county or city where the sale is to 
take place, for not less than seven nor more than 14 days, and by publish-
ing a copy thereof at least one time not less than one day preceding the 
sale in some newspaper of general circulation published or circulated in 
the county where the sale is to take place, if there is one; (C) in case of 
real property, by posting written notice of the time and place of sale, and 
particularly describing the property, for 21 days, on the property to be 
sold, at the place of sale, at the district courthouse of the county where the 
real property to be sold is situated, and in at least three public places of 
the county or city where the sale is to take place, and by publishing a copy 
thereof at least 3 times, once a week for 3 successive weeks immediately 
preceding the sale, in some newspaper of general circulation published or 
circulated in the county, if there is one. In addition, except for the sale of 
perishable property or animals, if notice of the date and time of sale has 
not been served upon the judgment debtor previously, notice of the date 
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and time of sale shall be served upon the judgment debtor personally or 
by causing the same to be transmitted by regular or certified mail to the 
judgment debtor's last known address. 
(2) Postponement If at the time and place appointed for the sale of 
any real or personal property on execution the officer shall deem it expe-
dient and for the interest of all persons concerned to postpone the sale for 
want of purchasers, or other sufficient cause, the officer may postpone the 
same from time to time, until the same shall be completed; and in every 
such case the officer shall make public declaration thereof at the time and 
place previously appointed for the sale, and if such postponement is for a 
longer time than 72 hours, notice thereof shall be given in the same 
manner as the original notice of such sale is required to be given. 
(3) Conduct of sale. All sales of property under execution must be 
made at auction to the highest bidder, Monday through Saturday, legal 
holidays excluded, between the hours of 9 o'clock a.m. and 8 o'clock p.m. 
After sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the execution no more 
shall be sold. Neither the officer holding the execution nor such officer's 
deputy shall become a purchaser, or be interested in any purchase at such 
sale. When the sale is of personal property capable of manual delivery it 
must be within view of those who attend the sale. The sale must be held 
in a place reasonably accessible to the general public. The property must 
be sold in such parcels as are likely to bring the highest price; and when 
the sale is of real property, consisting of several known lots or parcels, 
they must be sold separately; or when a portion of such real property is 
claimed by a third person, and the third person requires it to be sold 
separately, such portion must be thus sold. All sales of real property must 
be made at the courthouse of the county in which the property, or some 
part thereof, is situated. The judgment debtor, if present at the sale, may 
also direct the order in which the property, real or personal, shall be sold, 
when such property consists of several known lots or parcels, or of articles 
which can be sold to advantage separately, and the officer 'must follow 
such directions. The officer shall pay to the judgment creditor or the 
attorney for the judgment creditor so much of the sales proceeds as will 
satisfy the judgment. Any excess in the proceeds over the judgment and 
reasonable accrued costs must be returned to the judgment debtor, unless 
otherwise directed by the judgment or the court. 
(4) Accounting of sale. Upon request of the judgment debtor or the 
judgment debtor's attorney, the plaintiff shall deliver an accounting of 
any execution sale, including the amount due on the judgment, accrued 
costs, and the amount realized at the sale. 
(5) Purchaser refusing to pay. Every bid shall be deemed an irrevo-
cable offer; and if the purchaser refuses to pay the amount bid for the 
property struck off to such purchaser at a sale under execution, the officer 
may again sell the property at any time to the highest bidder, and if any 
loss is occasioned thereby, the party refusing to pay, in addition to being 
liable on such bid, is guilty of a contempt of court and may be punished 
accordingly. When a purchaser refuses to pay, the officer may also, in 
such officer's discretion, thereafter reject any other bid of such person. 
(6) Personal property. When the purchaser of any personal property 
pays the purchase money, the officer making the sale shall deliver the 
property to the purchaser (if such property is capable of manual delivery) 
and shall execute and deliver to the purchaser a certificate of sale and 
payment. Such certificate shall state that all right, title and interest 
which the debtor had in and to such property on the day the execution or 
attachment was levied, and any right, title and interest since acquired, is 
transferred to the purchaser. 
(7) Real property. Upon a sale of real property the officer shall give 
to the uurchaser a certificate of sale, containing: (A) a particular descrip-
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tion of the real property sold; (B) the price paid by the purchaser for each 
lot or parcel if sold separately; (C) the whole price paid; (D) a statement to 
the effect that all right, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor in 
and to the property is conveyed to the purchaser; provided that where 
such sale is subject to redemption that fact shall be stated also. A dupli-
cate of such certificate shall be filed for record by the officer in the office 
of the recorder of the county. The real property sold shall be subject to 
redemption, except where the estate sold is less than a leasehold of a two-
years' unexpired term, in which event said sale is absolute, 
(j) Redemption of real property from sale. 
(1) Who may redeem. Real property sold subject to redemption, or 
any part sold separately, may be redeemed by the following persons or 
their successors in interest: (A) the judgment debtor; (B) a creditor having 
a lien by judgment, mortgage, or other lien on the property sold, or on 
some share or part thereof, subsequent to that on which the property was 
sold. 
(2) Redemption; how made. The person seeking redemption may 
make payment of the amount required to the person from whom the 
property is being redeemed, or for such person to the officer who made the 
sale, or such officer's successor in office. At the same time the redemp-
tioner must produce to the officer or person from whom the redemptioner 
seeks to redeem, and serve with the notice to the officer; (A) a certified 
copy of the judgment under which the redemptioner claims the right to 
redeem, or, if the redemptioner redeems upon a mortgage or other lien, a 
copy certified by the recorder; (B) an assignment, properly acknowledged 
or proved where the same is necessary to establish the claim; (C) an 
affidavit by the redemptioner or an authorized agent showing the amount 
then actually due on the judgment, mortgage or other lien. 
(3) Time for redemption; amount to be paid. The property may be 
redeemed within six months after the sale by paying the amount of the 
purchase with a surcharge of 6 percent thereon in addition, together with 
the amount of any assessment or taxes, and any reasonable sum for fire-
insurance and necessary maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any improve-
ments upon the property,which the purchaser may have paid thereon 
after the purchase, with interest at the lawful rate on such other 
amounts, and, if the purchaser is also a creditor having a lien prior to that 
of the person seeking redemption, other than the judgment under which 
said purchase was made, the amount of such other lien, with interest. 
In the event there is a disagreement as to whether any sum demanded 
for redemption is reasonable or proper, the person seeking redemption 
may pay the amount necessary for redemption, less the amount in dis-
pute, to the court out of which execution or order authorizing the sale was 
issued, and at the same time file with the court and serve upon the 
purchaser a petition setting forth the item or items demanded to which 
the redemptioner objects, together with the grounds of objection; and 
thereupon the court shall enter an order fixing a time for hearing of such 
objections. A copy of the order fixing time for hearing shall be served on 
the purchaser not less than five days before the day of hearing. Upon the 
hearing of the petition the court shall enter an order determining the 
amount required for redemption. In the event an additional amount to 
that theretofore paid to the clerk is required, the person seeking redemp-
tion shall pay to the clerk such additional amount within 7 days. The 
purchaser shall forthwith execute and deliver a proper certificate of re-
demption upon being paid the amount required by the court for redemp-
tion. 
(4) Subsequent redemptions* If the property is redeemed by a credi-
tor, any other creditor having a right of redemption may, within 60 days 
after the last redemption and within six months aft^r thp «mlp T*ACU*™ fVn* 
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property from such last redemptioner in the same manner as provided in 
the preceding paragraph, upon paying the sum of such last redemption, 
with a surcharge of three percent thereon in addition, and the amount of 
any assessment or tax, and any reasonable stun for fire insurance and 
necessary maintenance, upkeep or repair of any improvements upon the 
property which the last redemptioner may have paid thereon, with inter-
est on such amount, and, in addition, the amount of any lien held by such 
last redemptioner prior to the redemptioner^ own, with interest. 
(5) Notice of redemption. Written notice of any redemption shall be 
given to the officer and a duplicate filed with the recorder of the county. 
Similar notice shall be given of any taxes or assessments or any sums for 
fire insurance, and necessary maintenance, upkeep or repair of any im-
provements upon the property, paid by the person redeeming, or the 
amount of any lien acquired, other than upon which the redemption was 
made. Failure to file such notice shall relieve any subsequent redemp-
tioner of the obligation to pay such taxes, assessments, or other liens. 
(6) Certificate of redemption or conveyance. If no redemption is 
made within six months after the sale, the purchaser or the purchaser's 
assignee is entitled to a conveyance; or if so redeemed, whenever 60 days 
have elapsed and no other redemption by a creditor has been made and 
notice thereof has been given, the last redemptioner, or assignee, is enti-
tled to a sheriff's deed at the expiration of six months after the sale. If the 
judgment debtor redeems, the judgment debtor must make the same pay-
ments as are required to effect a redemption by a creditor. If the debtor 
redeems, the effect of the sale is terminated and the debtor is restored to 
the debtor's estate. Upon a redemption by the debtor, the person to whom 
the payment is made must execute and deliver to the debtor a certificate 
of redemption, duly acknowledged. Such certificate must be filed and 
recorded in the office of the county recorder where the property is situ-
ated. 
(7) Rents during period of redemption. The purchaser from the 
time of sale until a redemption, and a redemptioner from the time of 
redemption until another redemption, is entitled to receive from any ten-
ant in possession the rents of the property sold or the value of the use and 
occupation thereof. But when any rents or profits have been received by 
the judgment creditor or purchaser, or their assigns, from the property 
thus sold preceding such redemption, the amounts of such rents and 
profits shall be a credit upon the redemption money to be paid; and if the 
redemptioner or judgment debtor, before the expiration of the time al-
lowed for such redemption, demands in writing of such purchaser or credi-
tor, or their assigns, a written and verified statement of the amoxmts of 
such rents and profits thus received, the period for redemption is ex-
tended five days after such sworn statement is given by such purchaser or 
such purchaser's assigns to such redemptioner or debtor. If such pur-
chaser or such purchaser's assigns shall for a period of one month from 
and after such demand, fail or refuse to give such statement, such re-
demptioner or debtor may, within 60 days after such demand, bring an 
action to compel an accounting and disclosure of such rents and profits, 
and until 15 days from and after the final determination of such action 
the right of redemption is extended to such redemptioner or debtor. 
(k) Remedies of purchaser. 
(1) For waste. Until the expiration of the time allowed for redemp-
tion, the court may restrain the commission of waste on the property, 
upon motion, with or without notice, of the purchaser, or such purchaser's 
successor in interest. But it is not waste for the person in possession of the 
property at the time of sale, or entitled to possession afterwards, during 
the period allowed for redemption, to continue to use it in the same man-
ner in which it was Dreviously used, or to use it in the ordinary course of 
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husbandry, or to make the necessary repairs or buildings thereon or to 
use wood or timber on the property therefor, or for the repair of fences, or 
for fuel for a family while such person occupies the property. After the 
estate has become absolute, the purchaser or a successor in interest may 
maintain an action to recover damages for iiyury to the properly by the 
tenant or other person in possession after sale and before possession is 
delivered under the conveyance. 
(2) Where purchaser fails to obtain possession of property or is 
dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom. Where, because of irregu-
larities in the proceedings concerning the sale, or because the property 
sold was not subject to execution and sale, or because of the reversal or 
discharge of the judgment, a purchaser of property sold on execution, or a 
successor in interest, fails to obtain the property or is dispossessed thereof 
or evicted therefrom, the court having jurisdiction thereof shall, on mo-
tion of such party and after such notice to the judgment creditor as the 
court may prescribe, enter judgment against such judgment creditor for 
the price paid by the purchaser, together with interest. In the alternative, 
if such purchaser or a successor in interest, fails to recover possession of 
any property or is dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom in conse-
quence of irregularity in the proceedings concerning the sale, or because 
the property sold was not subject to execution and sale, the court having 
jurisdiction thereof shall, on motion of such party and after such notice to 
the judgment debtor as the court may prescribe, revive the original judg-
ment in the name of the petitioner for the amount paid by such purchaser 
at the sale, with interest thereon from the time of payment at the same 
rate that the original judgment bore; and the judgment so revived shall 
have the same force and effect as would an original judgment of the date 
of the revival. 
0) Contribution and reimbursement; how enforced. When upon an 
execution against several persons more than a pro rata part of the judgment is 
satisfied out of the proceeds of the sale of the property of one, or one of them 
pays, without a sale, more than such person's proportion, and the right of 
contribution exists, such person may compel such contribution from the 
others; and where a judgment against several is upon an obligation of one or 
more as security for the others, and the surety has paid the amount or any 
part thereof, by sale of property or otherwise, the surety may require reim-
bursement from the principal. The person entitled to contribution or reim-
bursement shall, within one month after payment, or sale of the property in 
the event there is a sale, file in the court where the judgment was rendered a 
notice of such payment and the claim for contribution or reimbursement. 
Upon the filing of such notice the clerk must make an entry thereof in the 
margin of the docket which shall have the effect of a judgment against the 
other judgment debtors to the extent of their liability for contribution or 
reimbursement. 
(m) Payment of judgment by person indebted to judgment 
debtor. After the issuance of an execution and before its return, any person 
indebted to the judgment debtor may pay to the officer the amount of the debt, 
or so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the execution, and the 
officer's receipt is a sufficient discharge for the amount paid. 
(n) Where property is claimed by third person. If an officer shall pro-
ceed to levy any execution on any goods or chattels claimed by any person 
other than the defendant, or should the officer be requested by the judgment 
creditor so to do, such officer may require the judgment creditor to give an 
undertaking, with good and sufficient sureties, to pay all costs and damages 
that the officer may sustain by reason of the detention or sale of such prop-
erty; and until such undertaking is given, the officer may refuse to proceed 
against such property. 
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(o) Order for appearance of judgment debtor; arrest At any time 
when execution may issue on a judgment, the court from which an execution 
might issue shall, upon written motion of the judgment creditor, with or 
without notice as the court may determine, issue an order requiring the judg-
ment debtor, or if a corporation, any officer thereof, to appear before the court, 
a master, or other person appointed by the court, at a specified time and place 
to answer concerning the judgment debtor's property. A judgment debtor, or if 
a corporation, any officer thereof, may be required to attend outside the 
county in which such person resides, but the court may make such order as to 
mileage and expenses as is just The order may also restrain the judgment 
debtor from disposing of any nonexempt property pending the hearing. Upon 
the hearing such proceedings may be had for the application of the property of 
the judgment debtor toward the satisfaction of the judgment as on execution 
against such property. 
(p) Examination of debtor of judgment debtor. At any time when exe-
cution may issue on a judgment, upon proof by affidavit or otherwise to the 
satisfaction of the court that any person or corporation has property of such 
judgment debtor or is indebted to the judgment debtor in an amount exceeding 
two hundred fifty dollars, not exempt from execution, the court may order 
such person or corporation or any officer or agent thereof, to appear before the 
court or a master at a specified time and place to answer concerning the same. 
Witness fees and mileage, if any, may be awarded by the court 
(q) Order prohibiting transfer of property. If it appears that a person or 
corporation, alleged to have property of the judgment debtor or to be indebted 
to the judgment debtor in an amount exceeding fifty dollars, not exempt from 
execution, claims an interest in the property adverse to such judgment debtor 
or denies such indebtedness, the court may order such person or corporation to 
refrain from transferring or otherwise disposing of such interest or debt until 
such time as may reasonably be necessary for the judgment creditor to bring 
an action to determine such interest or claim and prosecute the same to judg-
ment. Such order may be modified or vacated by the court at any time upon 
such terms as may be just. 
(r) Witnesses. Witnesses may be required to appear and testify in any 
proceedings brought under this rule in the same manner as upon the trial of 
an issue. 
(s) Order for property to be applied on judgment The court or master 
may order any property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in 
the possession of the judgment debtor or any other person, or due to the 
judgment debtor, to be applied towards the satisfaction of the judgment. 
(t) Appointment of receiver. The court may appoint a receiver of the 
property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, and may forbid 
any transfer or other disposition thereof or interference therewith until its 
further order therein; provided that before any receiver shall be vested with 
the real property of the judgment debtor a certified copy of the appointment 
shall be recorded in the office of the recorder of the county in which any real 
estate sought to be affected thereby is situated. 
Advisory Committee Note. — The 1994 
amendments constitute a substantial reorgani-
zation and revision of the rule applicable to 
executions. While not an exhaustive list, the 
Advisory Committee notes the following signif-
icant changes: 
The Rule has been restructured to eliminate 
references to gender. 
Paragraph (a) specifies that a writ of execu-
tion is available only post judgment and Para-
graph (b) now states that a writ of execution 
may only be used to reach the judgment 
debtor's non-exempt real or personal property. 
The availability of writs of execution to reach 
non-exempt properly, and the requirement 
that the judgment creditor now notify the judg-
ment debtor of a right to exemptions, are de-
scribed in several provisions of the revised 
rule. This change incorporates similar notice 
procedures now utilized in Rule 64D, and alle-
viates constitutional due process problems in 
the previous rule. These constitutional issues 
were addressed by the United States Court of 
Appeals in Aacen v. San Juan County Sheriffs 
Department, 944 F.2d 691 (10th Cir. 1991), in-
volving a similar New Mexico Rule. 
Paragraph (d) retains the requirement that 
writs of execution be issued to aind served by a 
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sheriff or constable. A sheriff must make ser-
vice in the case of real property. Paragraph (d) 
also allows the use of a praecipe, which is com-
monly executed by the judgment creditor or the 
judgment creditor's counsel directing the offi-
cer to specific property to be levied upon. In 
practice, some officers will not execute a writ of 
execution without an accompanying praecipe. 
Paragraph (e) has been amended to allow the 
officer to serve the writ within sixty (60) days, 
although the return of the writ may be made 
thereafter. 
Paragraph (f) now defines "levy" as the sei-
zure of the non-exempt property and autho-
rizes the officer to hold the property in person 
or through one or more agents. It is common 
practice for the officer to appoint a "keeper" to 
hold the property pending sale as it is not al-
ways practical for the officer to take physical 
possession of the property. Language in this 
paragraph on payment of the sales proceeds 
has now been relocated to new Paragraph (i) on 
conducting the sale. Provisions in paragraph 
(f) regarding detailed procedures in event of 
death of the officer were deemed unnecessary 
and have been eliminated. 
Paragraph (g) is new and provides that the 
clerk shall attach to the writ of execution a 
notice of execution and exemptions and right to 
a hearing, and two copies of an application by 
which the judgment debtor may request a 
hearing. A similar procedure is contained in 
Rule 64D. It is expected in practice that the 
plaintiff will provide to the clerk the materials 
to be attached to the writ. Official forms for the 
notice of execution, exemptions and right to a 
hearing, and the application for a hearing have 
been prepared by the Committee. Service of 
these forms may be made personally in the 
same manner as service of a summons in a civil 
action or may be transmitted by mail to the 
judgment debtor's last known address as pro-
vided by the judgment creditor. Notice of the 
time and date of sale may also be served at the 
same time. Paragraph (g) also contains a publi-
cation form of service if the judgment creditor's 
last known address is not available. This para-
graph also sets forth the language to be in-
cluded in the notice and application to be 
served upon or mailed to the judgment debtor. 
Paragraph (g) is not applicable to judicial 
mortgage foreclosure proceedings since the 
real property in such an action has already 
been ordered sold by the court. 
Paragraph (h) is new. This paragraph con-
tains a hearing procedure similar to current 
hearing practice under Rule 64D and contains 
the time limits applicable to requests for a 
hearing to contest the writ of execution. This 
paragraph is not applicable to mortgage fore-
closure proceedings. 
Paragraph (i)(l) substantially revises the 
previous provision on notice of sale. In the case 
of non-perishable personal property, the notice 
must generally describe the property to be sold, 
the notice must be posted at the district court-
house and in at least three public places in the 
county or city where the sale is to take place, 
and it must be published in a newspaper of 
general circulation at least one day preceding 
the sale. In addition, in the event notice of the 
time and place of sale has not been previously 
served upon or mailed to the judgment debtor, 
or if the original sale date was canceled, this 
Paragraph requires that a copy of the notice of 
sale be served upon or mailed to the judgment 
debtor. The former rule simply required post-
ing in three public places. The Committee de-
termined that such notice would not reason-
ably apprise the judgment debtor or interested 
third parties of the time and place of sale. 
Those interested in the sale will also be able to 
review all notices at a central location, Le., the 
district courthouse. Similar changes have been 
made with respect to notice of sale of real prop-
erty. The Committee believes that the revi-
sions to this paragraph rectify several constitu-
tional issues raised by the former Rule. 
Paragraph (iX2) expands the time in which 
the officer may postpone the sale from one day 
to 72 hours. This coincides with a similar post-
ponement procedure in the Utah Trust Deed 
Foreclosure statute. 
Paragraph (iX3) clarifies the authorized days 
for a sale and expands the time allowed from 
9:00 o'clock a.m. to 8:00 o'clock pjn., rather 
than 5:00 o'clock p jn. This was intended by the 
Committee to expand the time during which 
the judgment debtor and third parties would be 
able to attend the sale. 
Paragraph (j) clarifies that redemption only 
pertains to real property and clarifies the pro-
cedure and documents required for redemption. 
Paragraph (o) pertains to orders in supple-
mental proceedings and authorizes the court to 
order the judgment debtor to appear before the 
court, a master or other person appointed by 
the court. It is intended by the Committee that 
this could include the judgment creditor's at-
torney. The former rule authorizing the judg-
ment debtor to be arrested based upon an affi-
davit has been eliminated. 
Amendment Notes* — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective January 1, 1995, rewrote this 
rule. 
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivision (c) of this 
rule was originally taken irom Rule 69(a), 
F.R.C.P. 
Crosa-References. — Contempt, Title 78, 
Chapter 32. 
Contribution among joint tort-feasors, 
S§ 78-27-39 to 78-27-43. 
County recorder, Title 17, Chapter 21. 
Duty to answer questions, § 78-24-9. 
Entry of a judgment after the death of a 
party, U.R.C.P. 58A(e). 
Execution and levy against decedent or per-
sonal representative prohibited, § 75-3-812. 
Fee, additional filing fee for cases where exe-
cution requested, i 21-1-5. 
Notice of execution, Form 31. 
Process in behalf of and against persons not 
parties, U.R.C.P. 71A. 
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Setting aside. 
Time of sale. 
—Postponement. 
From Saturday or day before holiday. 
—Procedural requirements. 
Redemption. 
—Amount to be paid. 
"Necessary maintenance, upkeep, or re-
pair." 
Payment into court. 
Waste. 
—Construction of rule. 
—Effect. 
Restoration of property to same condition. 
Waiver of irregularities. 
—How made. 
Defects in tender. 
Substantial compliance. 
—Timeliness. 
Extension of time. 
Pinal adjudication of rights. 
Strict compliance. 
—Who may redeem. 
Assignee of attorney's lien. 
Assignee of creditor. 
Bankruptcy trustee. 
Judgment debtor. 
Remedies of purchaser. 
—Dispossession. 
Scire facias. 
—Failure to obtain possession. 
Modification of judgment. 
Cited. 
Construction of rule. 
The procedures for redemption often confer 
substantive rights. Generally, therefore, when 
the procedure at issue affects the substantive 
rights of the parties, the procedure should be 
followed strictly in order not to interfere with 
these rights. Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531 
/Tu«v* ioo/n 
DECISIONS 
Contents of writ 
—Reissuance of first writ as second writ 
A clerk may, under circumstances that man-
date his issuance of a second writ of execution, 
reissue the first writ by acknowledging his ini-
tial signature thereon and using a seal previ-
ously stamped, and by so doing, he has fulfilled 
the formalities required by Subdivision (b) that 
the writ be issued in the name of the state of 
Utah, sealed with the court's seal, and sub-
scribed by the clerk. Heath Tecna Corp. v. 
Sound Sys. Intl, 588 P.2d 169 (Utah 1978). 
Contribution and reimbursement 
—Co-guarantors of installment debt 
Where plaintiff co-guarantor of installment 
debt had paid less than half of the outstanding 
balance due, his action against his co-guaran-
tors for contribution was premature since the 
right to contribution depends upon perfor-
mance by one of more than his proportionate 
share. Gardner v. Bean, 677 P.2d 1116 (Utah 
1984). 
—Joint owners. 
Under this rule there is no authority for dis-
tinguishing between the rights of redemption 
of a judgment lienholder, whose judgment was 
against only one joint owner, and of a lien-
holder whose lien covers the entire ownership. 
Tanner v. Lawler, 6 Utah 2d 268, 311 P.2d 791 
(1957). 
Where decedent had actively participated in 
purchase and furnishing of mobile home to be 
used for the mutual benefit of himself and 
plaintiff, and he and plaintiff had discussed 
marriage and in fact had resided in the mobile 
home together, trial court was justified in con-
cluding that the decedent was the joint pur-
chaser of the home, that there was a benefit 
given to him at his request, and that conse-
quently he received consideration for becoming 
a co-obligor on the purchase contract. Winkel 
v. Call, 603 P.2d 808 (Utah 1979). 
Enforcement of judgment 
—Method. 
A levy of execution is ordinarily the only 
proper method to enforce a judgment lien, un-
less the case involves special circumstances, 
such that execution does not lie, in which case 
the procedure for enforcement is an equitable 
action to foreclose the judgment lien. Belnap v. 
Blain, 575 P.2d 696 (Utah 1978). 
—Right of prevailing party. 
Party in whose favor judgment was rendered 
had a clear right to have it enforced, and if 
anyone attempted to interfere with that right 
it was also the clear duty of the court, in case a 
proper application was made, to enforce the 
judgment Ketchum Coal Co. v. Christensen, 
48 Utah 214,159 P. 541 (1916); Ketchum Coal 
Co. v. District Court, 48 Utah 342,159 P. 737, 
4 A.L.R. 619 (1916). 
Interest acquired by purchaser. 
—Lien. 
Purchaser of horse trailer at sheriffs sale 
took trailer with constructive notice of vehicle 
lien on it, notwithstanding slight discrepancies 
in the description of the trailer on the title cer-
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tificate. Basin Loans, Inc. v. Young, 764 P.2d 
239 (Utah Ct App. 1988). 
Issuance of writ 
—Partial assignment of judgment 
Partial assignment of a judgment and the 
execution sale held thereunder were valid 
where the judgment debtor had not paid any 
portion of the sizeable judgment against him 
and had not been subjected to collection efforts 
by the original judgment creditor; any 
amounts recovered by the assignee apparently 
inured to the benefit of the assignor, and there 
was no claim of prejudice to the judgment 
debtor resulting from the partial assignment 
or from the execution sale based on the partial 
assignment Oilroy v. Lowe, 626 P.2d 469 
(Utah 1981). 
—Prerequisites, 
Without an initial foreclosure judgment, the 
clerk has no basis upon which to calculate a 
deficiency. Thus, the clerk cannot enter a defi-
ciency judgment and abeent such a judgment 
he or she cannot properly issue a writ of execu-
tion. Tech-Fluid Servs., Inc. v. Gavilan Operat-
ing, Inc., 787 P.2d 1328 (Utah Ct App.), cert, 
denied, 796 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
—Stay, 
Bankruptcy. 
Failure to assert bankruptcy as a defense is 
not fatal to a later successful assertion of a 
discharge that postdates the judgment, so that 
a stay of execution of the judgment is proper 
based upon such discharge. Upton v. Heiselt 
Constr. Co., 3 Utah 2d 170, 280 P.2d 971 
(1966). 
—Timeliness. 
Where the judgment was rendered on Octo-
ber 22,1971, and the execution sale took place 
on Monday, October 22, 1979, the execution 
sale was timely. Gilroy v. Lowe, 626 P.2d 469 
(Utah 1981). 
Tolling. 
Part payment or written acknowledgment of 
a judgment does not toll the eight-year limita-
tion period for serving process to enforce a 
judgment by writ of execution. Yergensen v. 
Ford, 16 Utah 2d 397, 402 P.2d 696 (1966). 
Order for appearance of judgment debtor. 
—Issues raised. 
Constitutionality. 
Taxpayer who did not appeal a judgment 
against him for underpayment of income taxes 
could not raise the issue of the constitutional-
ity of the tax in a supplemental proceeding 
whose purpose was to determine the location 
and amount of taxpayer's property for purpose 
of satisfying the judgment State Tax Comm. v. 
Wright, 596 P.2d 634 (Utah 1979). 
Proceedings for sale of property. 
—Applicability of rule. 
Sales of property in partition proceedings 
should be governed by the statutes governing 
partition, and not by Subdivision (e). Gillmor 
v. Gillmor, 657 P.2d 736 (Utah 1982). 
—Conduct of sale, 
Separate parcels. 
Description in deed of land as "Lots 1 and 2 
of block 28, Plat A Manti City Survey" did not 
serve to separate an otherwise unified parcel 
into two parcels subject to separate sales under 
Subdivision (eX3). Commercial Bank v. 
Madsen, 120 Utah 519, 236 P.2d 343 (1951). 
Certified copy of a certificate of sale con-
tained in a supplemental record was sufficient, 
on appeal, to support trial court's determina-
tion that a parcel of real estate was sold sepa-
rately where the record contained conflicting 
evidence on the issue. Bawden & Assocs. v. 
Smith, 646 P.2d 711 (Utah 1982). 
In order for lots or parcels to qualify as 
"known lots or parcels" within the meaning of 
Subdivision (eX3), requiring them to be sold 
separately, the lots or parcels must be readily 
identifiable to the sheriff conducting the sale. 
Beesley v. Hatch, 863 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1993). 
Setting aside. 
A sale which has been regularly held and 
fairly conducted should not be set aside merely 
because a higher bid is offered later. Commer-
cial Bank v. Madsen, 120 Utah 619, 236 P.2d 
343 (1951). 
Time of sale. 
Sheriff conducting foreclosure sale may, in 
his discretion, set such time for sale as he 
chooses so long as it is within the limit pre-
scribed by this section. Commercial Bank v. 
Madsen, 120 Utah 519, 236 P^d 343 (1951). 
—Postponement 
From Saturday or day before holiday. 
When a sale which was to be held on a Satur-
day or the day before a holiday is postponed for 
one day, such that additional notice is not nec-
essary under Subdivision (eX2), the postpone-
ment is, pursuant to Rule 6(a), until the next 
business day. Mower v. Bohmke, 9 Utah 2d 52, 
337 P.2d 429 (1969). 
—Procedural requirements. 
The steps specified by Subdivision (eXD are 
necessary to levy on real property, and the exe-
cution of a writ is not begun until the officer 
has begun to perform these steps. Taubert v. 
Roberts, 747 PJ2d 1046 (Utah 1987). 
Redemption. 
—Amount to be paid. 
"Necessary maintenance, upkeep, or 
repair." 
Pre-redemption expenses necessitated by an 
order from the city to demolish the buildings 
on the property were limited to those costs in-
curred in actually razing the building and in 
filling the crawl space, and did not include the 
cost of filling the entire lot to raise its level to 
that of surrounding properties, or the cost of 
tree removal Galloway v. Merrill, 801 P.2d 
942 (Utah Ct App. 1990). 
Payment into court 
The intent of Subdivision (f)(3) is to allow a 
redemptioner to pay the funds into court so 
that the holder of the certificate of sale cannot 
clog the equity of redemption by refusing to 
cooperate in the redemption process. Granada, 
Inc. v. Tanner, 712 P.2d 254 (Utah 1985). 
Waste. 
No provision exists, in either 5 78-37-6 or 
Subdivision (f) of this rule, for the amount of 
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waste committed by a purchaser to enter into 
the formulation of the proper redemption 
amount Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531 (Utah 
1991). 
—Construction of rule. 
Foreclosure is in the nature of a forfeiture, 
which the law does not favor, and therefore, 
rules and statutes dealing with redemption are 
remedial in character and should be given a 
liberal construction. United States v. Loosley, 
661 P.2d 606 (Utah 1976). 
—Effect 
Restoration of property to same condi-
tion. 
The general effect of a redemption by the 
judgment debtor or his successor is that it re-
stores the property to the same condition as if 
no sale had been attempted. Bennion v. Amoss, 
630 P.2d 810 (Utah 1975). 
Waiver of irregularities. 
By redeeming the property, debtor waived 
and was estopped from asserting any irregular-
ities in the foreclosure sale. Bennion v. Amoss, 
630 P.2d 810 (Utah 1976). 
—How made. 
Defects in tender. 
Where at time of tendered redemption pay-
ment by assignee of mortgagee to purchasers 
at sheriffs sale no grounds for rejection were 
made, subsequent claim that assignee's failure 
to include copy of judgment and amount of lien 
with payment was not deemed sufficient rea-
son to reject tender. United States v. Loosley, 
561 P.2d 506 (Utah 1976). 
Substantial compliance. 
If a debtor, acting in good faith, has substan-
tially complied with the procedural require-
ments of this rule in such a manner that the 
lender mortgagee is not injured or adversely 
affected, and is getting what he is entitled to, 
the law will not aid in depriving the mortgagor 
of his property for mere falling short of exact 
compliance with technicalities. United States 
v. Loosley, 661 P.2d 606 (Utah 1976). 
Substantial compliance is the proper test un-
der Subdivision (f)(2). Tech-Fluid Servs., Inc. v. 
Gavilan Operating, Inc., 787 P.2d 1328 (Utah 
Ct. App.), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 
1990). 
—Timeliness. 
Extension of time. 
A court, sitting in equity, may in appropriate 
instances extend the period for redemption 
from sales on execution. Mollerup v. Storage 
Sys. Intf 1, 669 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977). 
The matter of bankruptcy after foreclosure 
and sale does not constitute grounds for ex-
tending the time of redemption from sales on 
execution. Mollerup v. Storage Sys. Intfl, 569 
P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977). 
Final adjudication of rights. 
Where assignee of mortgagor who purchased 
prior to institution of foreclosure was not made 
a party to the foreclosure proceedings and his 
rights were not finally abjudicated until sev-
eral months after foreclosure, he had six 
months after such adjudication in which to re-
deem. Carlquist v. Coltharp, 67 Utah 514, 248 
P. 481, 47 AXJL 766 (1926). 
Strict compliance. 
The right of a purchaser at a sheriffs sale 
either to receive the proper redemption 
amount in accordance with Subdivision (f) or to 
have the title perfected at the end of the six-
month period is a substantive right Accord-
ingly, strict compliance with the six-month re-
demption period is normally required. Huston 
v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 631 (Utah 1991). 
Attempted redemption by payment of the 
purchase price, plus interest, six months after 
sale followed by payment of the undisputed 
portion of delinquent taxes more than two 
months later neither strictly nor substantially 
complied with Subdivision (0(3) and was prop-
erly denied as untimely. Springer v. Springer, 
866 P.2d 358 (Utah 1993). 
—Who may redeem. 
Assignee of attorney's lien. 
Assignee of recorded attorney's lien has 
right to redeem property subject to that lien 
from the purchaser at sheriffs sale following 
mortgage foreclosure of the property. Downey 
State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d 
1286 (Utah 1978). 
Assignee of creditor. 
Where a grantee of the mortgagor took the 
assignment of a sheriffs sale certificate from a 
judgment creditor in a foreclosure suit, instead 
of taking a certificate of redemption, the as-
signed interest was sulgect to the redemption 
rights of the assignee of a creditor having a 
judgment lien subsequent to the foreclosure 
Hen. Tanner v. Lawler, 6 Utah 2d 84,305 P.2d 
882, modified on another point, 6 Utah 2d 268, 
311 P.2d 791 (1957). 
Bankruptcy trustee* 
When a bankruptcy trustee was directed by 
court order to abandon her interest in an oil 
and gas well owned by the debtor, she neces-
sarily abandoned any right to redeem that 
might arise in the event of foreclosure. Tech-
Fluid Servs., Inc. v. Gavilan Operating, Inc., 
787 P.2d 1328 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, 
795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
Judgment debtor. 
A judgment debtor can redeem from a judg-
ment sale although he has parted with title 
prior to the sale. Clawson v. Moesser, 535 P.2d 
77 (Utah 1975). 
Remedies of purchaser. 
—-Dispossession. 
Scire facias. 
Intent and purpose of statute on remedies of 
dispossessed purchaser was to afford the relief 
provided for by the common-law writ of scire 
facias pertaining to the revival of judgments. 
Continental Natfl Bank & Trust Co. v. John H. 
Seely & Sons Co., 94 Utah 357, 77 P.2d 355, 
115 A.L.R. 543 (1938). 
—Failure to obtain possession. 
Modification of judgment. 
Subdivision (g)(2) was not applicable where 
plaintiff obtained the property but wanted a 
modification of the judgment Pitts -v. 
McLachlan, 567 P.2d 171 (Utah 1977). 
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Cited in Utah Poultry & Farmers Coop. v. 
Bonie, 13 Utah 2d 13, 367 P.2d 860 (1962); 
First of Denver Mtg. Investors v. C.N. Zundel 
& Aaaocs., 600 P.2d 621 (Utah 1979). 
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Right of junior mortgagee whose mortgage 
covers only a part of land subject to first mort-
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bound by foreclosure sale, 46 AJLR.3d 1362. 
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erty, injury to credit standing, reputation, sol-
vency, or profit potential as elements of dam-
age resulting from, 65 AJLJLSd 911. 
Mortgaged property, what constitutes waste 
justifying appointment of receiver of, 55 
AX.R.3d 1041. 
Failure or refusal of witness to give testi-
mony, tort or statutory liability for, 61 
AJLR.3d 1297. 
Garnishee's duty to give debtor notice of gar-
nishment prior to delivery of money without 
judgment against the garnishee on the debt, 36 
AJLR.4th 824. 
Liquor license as subject to execution or at-
tachment, 40 AXlUth 927. 
lien of judgment on excess value of home-
stead, 41 A U U t h 292. 
Constitutionality, construction, and applica-
tion of statute as to effect of taking appeal, or 
staying execution, on right to redeem from exe-
cution or judicial sale, 44 AXJEL4th 1229. 
Right of interested party receiving due no-
tice of tax sale or of right to redeem to assert 
failure or insufficiency of notice to other inter-
ested party, 45 A.L.R.4th 447. 
Judgment lien or levy of execution on one 
joint tenants share or interest as severing joint 
tenancy, 51 A.L.R.4th 906. 
Validity, construction, and effect of body exe-
cution statutes allowing imprisonment based 
on judgment, debt, or the like — modern cases, 
79 AXIUth 232. 
Propriety and effect of corporation's appear-
ance pro se through agent who is not attorney, 
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Key Numbers. — Execution *=* 1, 3, 35 et 
seq., 64, 67, 68, 69, 75, 78 et seq., 90, 127 et 
seq., 185,222,223,226,238,241,281,282,285 
et seq., 291, 293, 295, 296 et seq., 301, 305 et 
seq., 348,373 et seq., 385 et seq., 390,395,402, 
407 et seq., 421 et seq.; Judgments *» 632; 
Waste e» 12. 
Rule 70. Judgment for specific acts; vesting title. 
If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or to deliver 
deeds or other documents or to perform any other specific act and the party 
fails to comply within the time specified, the court may direct the act to be 
done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person appointed by 
the court and the act when so done has like effect as if done by the party. On 
application of the party entitled to performance and upon order of the court, 
the clerk shall issue a writ of attachment or sequestration against the prop-
erty of the disobedient party to compel obedience to the judgment. The court 
may also in proper cases adjudge the party in contempt. If real or personal 
property is within the state, the court in lieu of directing a conveyance thereof 
may enter a judgment divesting the title of any party and vestincr it in nth**™ 
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and such judgment has the effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law. 
When any order or judgment is for the delivery of possession, the party in 
whose favor it is entered is entitled to a writ of execution or assistance upon 
application to the clerk. 
Compiler^ Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 70, F.RC.P. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 71 Am. Jur. 2d Specific Per- AXJL — Lis pendens in suit to compel stock 
formance § 179 et seq. transfer, 48 A.L.R.4& 731. 
C.J.S. — 81A C J.S. Specific Performance Key Numbers. — Specific Performance *» 
5§ 168 to 170. 181, 132. 
Rule 71A. Process in behalf of and against persons not 
parties. 
When an order is made in favor of a person who is not a party to the action, 
he may enforce obedience to the order by the same process as if he were a 
party; and, when obedience to an order may be lawftdly enforced against a 
person who is not a party, he is liable to the same process for enforcing 
obedience to the order as if he were a party. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is identical 
to Rule 71, F.RC.P. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments C.J.S.—49 CJS. Judgments § J 686 to 690. 
i 767 et seq. Key Numbers. — Judgment *» 864, 866. 
Rule 71B. Proceedings where parties not summoned. 
(a) Effect of failure to serve all defendants. Where the action is against 
two or more defendants and the summons is served on one or more, but not all 
of them, the plaintiff may proceed against the defendants served in the same 
manner as if they were the only defendants. 
(b) Proceedings after judgment against parties not originally served. 
When a judgment has been recovered against one or more, but not all, of 
several persons jointly indebted upon an obligation, the plaintiff may require 
any person not originally served with the summons to appear and show cause 
why he should not be bound by the judgment in the same manner as though 
he had been originally served with process. 
(c) Summons and affidavit; contents and service. The plaintiff shall 
issue a summons, describing the judgment, and requiring the defendant to 
appear within the time required for appearance in response to an original 
summons, and show cause why he should not be bound by such judgment The 
summons, together with a copy of an affidavit on behalf of the plaintiff to the 
effect that the judgment, or some part thereof remains unsatisfied, and speci-
fying the amount actually due thereon, shall be served upon the defendant 
and returned in the same manner as the original summons. 
(d) What constitutes the pleadings. The pleadings shall consist, of plain-
tiffs affidavit, the summons, and the answer of the defendant, if any; provided 
that if defendant denies his liability on the obligation upon which the judg-
ment was originally recovered, a copy of the original complaint and judgment 
shall be included. 
(e) Hearing; judgment. The matter may be tried as other cases; but if the 
issues are found against the defendant, the judgment shall not exceed the 
amount of the original judgment remaining unsatisfied, with interest and 
costs. 
Compiler's Notes. — There is no federal Cross-References. — Authorizing service 
—« •— tuia oiikiArt matter. of process on other defendants, Rule 4(b). 
Tab 2 
. ~ „~ v, JUDICIAL CODE 
possession. Seeley v. Houston, 105 Utah 202, Crites, 106 Utah 428,150 P.2d 100, 154 A.L.R. 
141 P.2d 880 (1943). 167 (1944). 
Fact that one of defendants in forcible de-
Liability, tainer action by lessee of state land had signed 
— Lessor purchase contract covering such land would 
Where without serving the three davs'notice not> 'm i t s e l f ' m a k e h i m Pe™01""1/ ^able. 
J ^ - ^ K < r ^ \ ^ , v g r i T A*? Pa*™ v. Fisher, 86 Utah 408, 45 P.2d 903 
required by § 78-36-3(1X0 a lessor entered the
 { y Buchanari v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 
premises of his tenant, whose rent was two
 p u m l g 4 ^ L R 1 6 ? ( 1 9 4 4 ) 
months in arrears, changed the locks on the 
doors and refused to allow the tenant to enter to Occupancy "within five days." 
remove equipment and perishable goods, lessor _ Allegation. 
was guilty of forcible detainer and conversion of Allegation of "more* than five days includes 
the personal property on the premises, p ^ ^
 0f "within" five days. Woodbury v. Bun-
Peterson v. Piatt, 16 Utah 2d 330, 400 R2d 507
 k e l . 9 8 U t a h 216, 98 R2d 948 (1940); American 
<1965>- Mut. Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Jones, 102 Utah 318, 
-PnrrhftflAr 1 1 7 R 2 d 2 9 3 (19*1), rehearing denied, 102 
jrurcnaser. ^ p
 d Q943) 
Where purchaser of state land took posses- • v ; 
sion of land while lessee from state was away "Unlawfully enters." 
and refused to quit premises upon demand, he "Unlawfully enters" in Subsection (2) means 
was liable for forcible entry and detainer, since unlawfully as relating to an occupant who was 
such purchaser should have made proper de- there within five days. Woodbury v. Bunker, 98 
mand, and if it was refused, should have settled Utah 216, 98 P.2d 948 (1940); Buchanan v. 
question of possession by law. Paxton v. Fisher, Crites, 106 Utah 428,150 P.2d 100,154 A.L.R. 
86 Utah 408, 45 P.2d 903 (1935); Buchanan v. 167 (1944). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible Key Numbers. — Forcible Entry and De-
Entry and Detainer § 1. tainer <*=» 5. 
CJ&. - 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and De-
tainer §§ 1, 2. 
78-36-3. Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than 
life. 
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful 
detainer: 
(a) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the 
property or any part of it, after the expiration of the specified term or 
period for which it is let to him, which specified term or period, whether 
established by express or implied contract, or whether written or parol, 
shall be terminated without notice at the expiration of the specified term 
or period; 
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with 
monthly or other periodic rent reserved: 
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant after 
the end of any month or period, in cases where the owner, his 
designated agent, or any successor in estate of the owner, 15 days or 
more prior to the end of that month or period, has served notice 
requiring him to quit the premises at the expiration of that month or 
period; or 
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in possession of 
the premises after the expiration of a notice of not less than five days; 
(c) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after 
default in the payment of any rent and after a notice in writing requiring 
in the alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the detained 
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premises, has remained uncompiied with for a period of three days after 
service, which notice may be served at any time after the rent becomes 
due; 
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased premises contrary to the 
covenants of t .e lease, or commits or permits waste on the premises, or 
when he sets up or carries on any unlawful business on or in the premises, 
or when he suffers, permits, or maintains on or about the premises any 
nuisance, including nuisance as defined in Section 78-38-9, and remains in 
possession after service upon him of a three days' notice to quit; or 
(e) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after a 
neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or 
agreement under which the property is held, other than those previously 
mentioned, and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the 
performance of the conditions or covenant or the surrender of the property, 
served upon him and upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the 
premises remains uncompiied with for three days after service. Within 
three days after the service of the notice, the tenant, any subtenant in 
actual occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of the term, or other 
person interested in its continuance may perform the condition or cov-
enant and thereby save the lease from forfeiture, except that if the 
covenants and conditions of the lease violated by the lessee cannot 
afterwards be performed, then no notice need be given. 
(2) Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a mobile home is determined 
under Title 57, Chapter 16, Mobile Home Park Residency Act. 
(3) The notice provisions for nuisance in Subsection 78-36-3(lXd) are not 
applicable to nuisance actions provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16 
only. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, $ 1; C. 1943, ing nuisance as defined in Section 78-38-9,* in 
Supp., 104-36-3; L. 1981, ch. 160, 5 1; 1986, Subsection (lXd) and added Subsection (3). 
ch, 137,5 1; 1989, ch-101, § 1; 1992, ch. 141, Cross-References. - Nuisances, Title 47. 
5 *• Right to recover treble damages from tenants 
Amendment Notes, - The 1992 amend- committing waste, § 78-38-2. 
ment, effective April 27,1992, inserted "includ-
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based on default in payment of rent survived 
where tenant tendered rent due within three 
days after service of unlawful detainer action, 
regardless of defects in such notice. Dang v. Cox 
Corp., 655 P.2d 658 (Utah 1982). 
— Prerequisites. 
Notice to quit is necessary to give rise to 
cause of action. Carstensen v. Hansen, 107 
Utah 234, 152 P.2d 954 (1944). 
Service of the statutory notice and the ten-
ant's noncompliance are prerequisites to the 
tenant's being in unlawful detainer. Olympus 
Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Landes, 821 P.2d 
451 (Utah 1991). 
— Presumptions. 
Action of unlawful detainer presupposes ab-
sence of fraud and force, as well as existence of 
relation of landlord and tenant. Holladay Coal 
Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah 192, 57 P. 882 (1899). 
— When determined. 
Whether a cause of action exists under this 
section is to be determined at the time the 
action is commenced. Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 
15 Utah 2d 367, 393 P.2d 468 (1964). 
— When exists. 
Upon expiration of tenant's lease, the tenant 
is subject to ouster by an unlawful detainer 
action (not forcible detainer) under and pursu-
ant to this section. Woodbury v. Bunker, 98 
Utah 216, 98 P.2d 948 (1940); American Mut. 
Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Jones, 102 Utah 318, 117 
R2d 293 (1941), rehearing denied, 102 Utah 
328, 133 P.2d 332 (1943). 
Unless tenant has retained the right to 
refuse inspection by prospective purchasers of 
premises, unreasonable refusal to permit entry 
of premises for that purpose constitutes unlaw-
ful detainer. Glenn v. Keyes, 107 Utah 415,154 
P.2d 642 (1944). 
Federal regulations. 
— Modification of s tate remedies. 
OPA rental and housing regulations, under 
Federal Price Control Act, were binding upon 
Utah courts and modified any state remedy to 
extent that such remedy was in conflict with 
that act. Callister v. Spencer, 113 Utah 497,196 
R2d 714 (1948). 
In general. 
This chapter takes away the landlord's com-
mon law right to use self-help to remove a 
tenant, grants the landlord a summary court 
proceeding to evict a tenant who has violated 
some express or implied provision of the lease, 
and provides five instances in which the tenant 
is in unlawful detainer. The remedy for a suc-
cessful landlord is restitution of the premises, 
treble damages, and recovery for waste or rent 
due. If the unlawful detainer action is based on 
default in payment of rent, the judgment will 
also mandate forfeiture of the lease. P. H. Inv. v. 
Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018 (Utah 1991). 
Notice to quit. 
— Administrative claim. 
Notice to quit or pay rent served on govern-
ment as required by this section was not an 
administrative claim sufficient to satisfy 28 
U.S.C. § 2675(a), and federal court therefore 
had no jurisdiction over forcible entry and de-
tainer action brought under Federal Tbrt 
Claims Act. Three-M Enters., Inc. v. United 
States, 548 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1977). 
— Liability of tenant. 
Action by lessor, after end of fixed term of 
lease, to terminate lease and require lessee to 
vacate premises did not terminate provision 
obliging tenant to pay attorney fees, where 
parties entered stipulation, while matter was 
pending, that lessee considered lease in effect 
and held under it after end of fixed term. 
Milliner v. Farmer, 24 Utah 2d 326, 471 P.2d 
151 (1970). 
— Prerequisites. 
Notice in accordance with Subsection (lXe) 
should precede notice to quit, and must be 
uncomplied with for five days after the service 
before a notice to quit is in order. Fireman's Ins. 
Co. v. Brown, 529 P.2d 419 (Utah 1974). 
— Sufficiency. 
A notice to quit is sufficient under Subsection 
(1Kb) in the case of a tenancy at will, as 
provided in contract of sale in case of default, 
where it merely declares a forfeiture, and is not 
insufficient under Subsection (lXe) because not 
giving purchasers alternative of performing 
conditions of the agreement. Forrester v. Cook, 
77 Utah 137, 292 P. 206 (1930); American 
Holding Co. v. Hanson, 23 Utah 2d 432, 464 
P2d 592 (1970). 
Notice to quit which notified tenant that he 
was violating substantial obligations of tenancy 
by conducting certain businesses on premises, 
and which plainly informed tenant that he 
must desist from such objectionable practices 
by certain date and that, if on or before that 
date he failed to desist therefrom and had not 
surrendered premises, action would be com-
menced for restitution of premises, was not 
defective because notice was not expressed in 
the alternative as required by Subsection (lXe) 
of former § 104-60-3, i.e., that violation must 
cease or tenancy be vacated, since such was 
plain intent of notice without use of word "or." 
Callister v. Spencer, 113 Utah 497,196 P.2d 714 
(1948). 
Notice by landlord stating that tenants had 
failed to make payments of rent due under 
lease, had failed to pay utility bills, and further 
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providing that tenants were to quit premises 
and deliver up possession to landlord within 
fifteen days did not comply with statutory re-
quirements under this section; in absence of 
compliance, landlord was not entitled to main-
tain action for restitution of premises. Ameri-
can Holding Co. v. Hanson, 23 Utah 2d 432,464 
P.2d 592 (1970). 
Notice of forfeiture, while sufficient to termi-
nate a lease for breach of covenant, is not 
sufficient to put lessee in unlawful detainer; the 
notice to quit must be in the alternative, i.e., 
either perform or quit, before lessee becomes 
subject to the provisions of this chapter. 
Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 
P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976). 
Lessee was not in unlawful detainer and 
lessor was not entitled to maintain an action 
under this section where lessor's notice to va-
cate premises was defective in that it did not 
state that lessee had the alternative of paying 
the delinquent rent or surrendering the pre-
mises. Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 P.2d 852 
(Utah 1979). 
A notice to a month-to-month tenant to quit 
the premises need not contain the alternative of 
paying rent. Ute-Cal Land Dev. v. Intermoun-
tain Stock Exch., 628 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1981). 
The critical distinction between a notice of 
unlawful detainer and a notice of forfeiture is 
that the notice of forfeiture simply declares a 
termination of the lease without giving the 
lessee the alternative of making up the defi-
ciency. Dang v. Cox Corp., 655 P.2d 658 (Utah 
1982). 
Letter stating that "[i]n the event that [les-
see] does not immediately re-open and continu-
ously conduct normal business operations in 
the premises, [lessor] will terminate the Lease 
... as well as seek damages and all other 
available legal relief for the breach" met the 
requirements of Subsection (lXe). Olympus 
Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food & 
Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). 
— Tenancy at will. 
At common law a tenant at will was not 
entitled to notice to quit possession. Buchanan 
v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100, 154 
A.L.R. 167 (1944). 
It is only after buyer is in the status of a 
tenant at will that he is amenable to the notice 
provided by this section, which requires him to 
vacate within five days or be guilty of an 
unlawful detainer. Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 15 
Utah 2d 367, 393 P2d 468 (1964). 
Where lease was terminated by failure of 
tenant to pay rent and taxes, the tenant be-
came a tenant at will and landlord properly 
proceeded to regain possession by the proce-
dure set forth in Subsection (1Kb) by giving 
notice to vacate. Shoemaker v. Pioneer Invs., 14 
Utah 2d 250, 381 P.2d 735 (1963). 
Notice to purchaser who had become tenant 
at will for failure to make payment was suffi-
cient under Subsection (lXe) even though sev-
eral months had elapsed between first and final 
notice. Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Dennett, 24 
Utah 2d 310, 470 P.2d 406 (1970). 
Persons liable. 
No one but tenant of real property for term 
less than life can be guilty of unlawful detainer. 
Holladay Coal Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah 192, 57 P. 
882 (1899). 
Pleadings. 
— Tenancy at will. 
Since on month-to-month tenancy owner 
could recover property on fifteen-day notice, 
allegation in complaint that such tenant had 
violated substantial obligations of rental agree-
ment was not necessary in unlawful detainer 
action. Callister v. Spencer, 113 Utah 497, 196 
P.2d 714 (1948). 
Right of re-entry. 
— Contractual provisions. 
Under contract for sale and exchange of real 
estate, providing that seller at his option could 
re-enter premises and be released from his 
obligations upon default of buyer, seller was 
bound to give buyer notice of his intention to 
take advantage of forfeiture provision of con-
tract, since such provision was not self-execut-
ing. Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417,34 P.2d 699, 
94 A.L.R. 1232 (1934). 
Strict performance. 
— Waiver. 
Acceptance by vendor of purchaser's past-due 
payments under uniform real estate contract, 
and other conduct leading latter to believe that 
strict performance would not be required by 
vendor, imposes duty on vendor to give pur-
chaser reasonable notice before vendor may 
insist on strict performance by purchaser. Pa-
cific Dev. Co. v. Stewart, 113 Utah 403,195 P.2d 
748 (1948). 
Strict statutory compliance. 
— Not required. 
There is no reason for the strict rule that 
landlord must demand the precise or exact 
amount of rent due or lose his right to recover 
possession of the premises. A tenant is guilty of 
unlawful detainer when he continues in posses-
sion after default in payment of any rent, and 
after notice in writing requiring in the alterna-
tive the payment of the rent or the surrender of 
the premises, etc. Commercial Block Realty Co. 
v. Merchants' Protective Ass'n, 71 Utah 505, 
267 P. 1009 (1928). 
/a-tJb-4 JUDICIAL CODE 
— Required. 
This section, which provides a severe remedy, 
must be strictly complied with before the cause 
of action thereon may be maintained. Van 
Zyverden v. Farrar, 15 Utah 2d 367, 393 P.2d 
468 (1964). 
Substantial compliance. 
The substantial compliance doctrine applies 
in some residential lease situations to defeat a 
landlord's attempt to forfeit a lease because of a 
tenant's minor breach. Housing Auth. v. 
Delgado, 914 R2d 1163 (Utah Ct App. 1996). 
The substantial compliance doctrine furthers 
the courts' general policy disfavoring forfei-
tures by allowing equity to intervene and res-
cue a lessee from forfeiture of a lease when the 
lessee has substantially complied with the 
lease in good faith. Housing Auth. v. Delgado, 
914 R2d 1163 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Trial court correctly determined that the eq-
uitable doctrine of substantial compliance ap-
plies to residential leases in Utah, and its 
findings that defendant had substantially com-
plied with lease at issue was supported by 
adequate evidence. Housing Auth. v. Delgado, 
914 P.2d 1163 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Termination of lease. 
A lease may be terminated pursuant to an 
unlawful detainer action. Hackford v. Snow, 
657 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1982). 
Treble damages. 
— Contract of sale. 
In a suit for amounts due under a contract of 
sale of real estate, where the vendors gave 
notice of forfeiture of the contract only and did 
not give the purchaser an alternative to pay up 
or quit, as is required under this section, the 
vendors were not entitled to treble damages for 
unlawful detainer. Erisman v. Overman, 11 
Utah 2d 258, 358 P.2d 85 (1961). 
— Intervenor. 
A person not actually occupying the premises 
who intervenes in an action to obtain posses-
sion and for damages for unlawful detainer, 
and who asserts ownership and the right to 
possession by the occupier as his tenant, may 
be guilty of unlawful detainer and liable for 
treble damages where the court finds this in-
tervener's claim invalid. Tanner v. Lawler, 6 
Utah 2d 84, 305 P.2d 882, modified on another 
point, 6 Utah 2d 268, 311 P.2d 791 (1957). 
— Lease. 
Under a lease contract for a period of years, 
in which the lessee defaulted, notice by the 
lessor for the lessees to quit the premises was 
not sufficient for treble damages. Under such a 
lease the statutes require an alternative notice 
that the tenant either perform or quit before he 
becomes an unlawful detainer and subject to 
treble damages. Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 
59, 278 P.2d 294 (1954). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jar. 2d. — 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and 
Tenant § 352 et seq.; 50 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord 
and Tenant § 264 et seq. 
CJJS. - 52A C J.S. Landlord and Tenant 
§ 758, 
AXJL — Right of landlord legally entitled to 
possession to dispossess tenant without legal 
process, 6 AX.R.3d 177. 
Grazing or pasturage agreement as violation 
of covenant in lease or provision of statute 
against assigning or subletting without lessor's 
consent, 71 AX.R.3d 780. 
Express or implied restriction on lessee's use 
of residential property for business purposes, 
46AXJR.4th496. 
Landlord's permitting third party to occupy 
premises rent-free as acceptance of tenant's 
surrender of premises, 18 AX.R.5th 437. 
Key Numbers. — Landlord and Tenant «=» 
290. 
78-36-4. Right of tenant of agricultural lands to hold over. 
In all cases of tenancy upon agricultural lands, where the tenant has held 
over and retained possession for more than 60 days after the expiration of his 
term without any demand of possession or notice to quit by the owner, his 
designated agent, or his successor in estate, he shall be deemed to be held by 
permission of the owner, his designated agent, or his successor in estate, and 
shall be entitled to hold tinder the terms of the lease for another full year, and 
shall not be guilty of an unlawful detainer during that year; and the holding 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AMD FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHANGRI-LA GARDEN APARTMENTS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UAW PROPERTIES, L.C., at al., 
Defendants. 




SHANGRI-LA GARDEN APARTMENTS 
Counterdefendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 0902686 0902686 _ A 
This matter was tried to the Court on April 13, 1998. At that 
time the Court received testimony, heard oral argument, and having 
taken the matter under advisement, now finds and rules as follows: 
The plaintiff attacks the Judgment foreclosure sale on the 
subject property by first saying that it did not receive adequate 
notice of the sale. The Court finds that adequate notice was given 
in that notice was sent to the address used by plaintiff when it 
instituted the small claims action which initially gave rise to the 
Judgment, when notice was posted on the property, left at the 
manager's office, and further when published as required by law. 
SHANGRI-LA V. UAW PROPERTIES PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff also attacks the Judgment by arguing that the 
execution sale was not authorized by the Schwichts. The Court 
finds that Mr. Olsen was authorized to act on behalf of Mr. Hagen, 
who was authorized by the Schwichts to collect on the Judgment. 
Plaintiff argues that a settlement agreement had been reached 
between plaintiffs counsel and Mr. Olsen prior to the sale. The 
Court finds that no settlement agreement had been reached and that 
Mr. Olsen had agreed to stop the sale of the property only if he 
had received payment on the Judgment prior to the sale. 
Plaintiff also argues that the underlying Judgment is against 
a nonexistent party. The Court rejects this argument. The initial 
action against the Schwichts was brought by plaintiffs in the name 
of Shangri-La Garden Apartments, UBO. Plaintiff brought this 
action in the name of Shangri-La Garden Apartments. Stanley Wade 
has filed an Affidavit indicating he is the sole trustee of 
Shangri-La Garden Apartments, UBO. A subsequent action against the 
Schwichts for fraud was filed in the name of Shangri-La Garden 
Apartments, Inc. The Complaint in this matter, which is signed by 
Stanley Wade as trustee for Shangri-La Garden Apartments, alleges 
that "Shangri-La Garden Apartments" as plaintiff was the "sole and 
exclusive fee owner of the property...." The Court is of the 
opinion that under all of the circumstances of this case, that the 
SHANGRI-LA V. UAW PROPERTIES PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Judgment was obtained against the owner of the property in 
question. 
Plaintiff argues that the Writs of Execution were issued 
improperly because of the addition of attorney's fees. It should 
be noted, however, that the plaintiff accepted and cashed, without 
objection, the check for the excess proceeds it received from the 
sheriff's sale. 
In any event, the Court feels that the arguments made by 
plaintiff to invalidate the sale are an impermissible collateral 
attack on the Judgment. The Court finds that the execution sale 
was valid. 
The Court turns to the question of equitable redemption. The 
Court finds in this case that the plaintiff, through Mr. Wade, had 
notice of the execution sale prior to the sale. The Court also 
finds that the plaintiff, through Mr. Stan Wade, knew by September 
19, 1996 or within a few short days thereafter that the property 
had been sold and that there would need to be a redemption. 
Clearly, Mr. Henderson, Shangri-La1s attorney, knew by September 
19, 1996 that the sheriff's sale had taken place. That is the date 
that he wrote to Mr. Wade advising Mr. Wade that he had received 
back the check from Mr. Olsen which was intended to pay the 
Judgment, and advising Mr. Wade that there would need to be a 
SHANGRI-LA V. UAW PROPERTIES PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
redemption. This information known to Mr. Henderson, as Mr. Wadefs 
attorney, would be charged to Mr. Wade. 
Having made the foregoing findings, the Court is nevertheless 
of the opinion that the redemption period should be extended in 
this case and that the equitable redemption sought by the plaintiff 
should be allowed. The enormous discrepancy between the value of 
the property and the amount for which the property was purchased 
compels the Court to this result. It should be noted that Mr. Wade 
did indeed make efforts to pay the Judgment prior to the sherifffs 
sale, and quite certainly was under the impression that that had 
been accomplished through his attorney, Mr. Henderson. It is 
inexplicable to the Court why, having received information from Mr. 
Henderson that the sale had taken place, the plaintiff did not take 
immediate steps to redeem the property. Mr. Wade and his wife have 
owned, developed and cared for this property for over 25 years. 
The Court feels that the circumstances of this case are exceptional 
and that it would shock the conscience of the Court to allow this 
$4.2 million piece of property to be purchased for $8,000. 
The defendants point to the fact that Mr. Wade has been 
dilatory in this case by not complying with discovery rules. While 
that may or may not be so, there are remedies for such conduct and 
SHANGRI-LA V. UAW PROPERTIES PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
the Court has not considered those in determining the equities 
bearing on the equitable redemption issue. 
The Court is of the opinion that defendants UAW Properties and 
DLM Investments are entitled to a return of their purchase price, 
plus attorney's fees incurred and taxes paid on the property# 
together with rents received on the property from the time of their 
purchase until the time of trial, which appears to be the amount of 
$304,333. Defendants claim that that amount should be trebled. 
The Court feels that the parties did not adequately address that 
issue and will ask defendants to file a short brief within ten (10) 
days hereof arguing for the trebling of damages. Plaintiff will 
then have ten (10) days thereafter within which to file its brief, 
and then defendants may have five (5) days thereafter to file a 
reply. Defendants should then file a "Notice to Submit". 
The parties have stipulated that the attorneyfs fees could be 
reserved. Counsel for defendants are to prepare their Affidavit of 
Attorneys Fees within ten (10) days. Plaintiff will then have ten 
(10) days thereafter if they wish to respond, at which time the 
Court will rule. 
Counsel for defendants UAW Properties and DLM Investments is 
to prepare a more detailed set of Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, together with an Order and Judgment, and submit it to 
SHANGRI-LA V, UAW PROPERTIES PAGE SIX MEMORANDUM DECISION 
opposing counsel for approval as to form, and then to this Court 
for signature. g 
Dated this _day of May, 1998. 
G. NOEL 
DISTRICT COURT JUDG 
1~ 1 
SHANGRI-LA V. UAW PROPERTIES PAGE SEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this ^7 day of 
May, 1998: 
Shawn Turner, Esq. 
4516 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Thomas J. Klc, Esq. 
4725 S. Holladay Blvd., Suite 110 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Stephen B. Mitchell 
Attorney for Defendants UAW and DLM 
139 E. South Temple, Suite 2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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SHAWN D. TURNER (5813) 
LARSON, KIRKHAM & TURNER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Counterdefendant 
4516 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
(801) 263-2900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHANGRI-LA GARDEN APARTMENTS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UAW PROPERTIES, L.C, et al., 
Defendants. 
UAW PROPERTIES, L.C, et al., 
Counterclaimants, 
vs 
RESPONSE TO MEMORANDUM OF 
DEFENDANT'S UAW PROPERTIES, L.C. 
AND DLM INVESTMENTS, L.L.C. 
RE: TREBLED DAMAGES 
Civil No. 970902686QT 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
SHANGRI-LA GARDEN APARTMENTS, : 
Counterdefendants. 
COMES NOW the Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel and pursuant to order of the court 
do hereby respond to the Memorandum of Defendant's UAW Properties, L.C. and DLM 
Investments, L.L.C. Re: Trebled Damages. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO TREBLED DAMAGES. 
A. The Unlawful Detainer Statute Does Not Apply in this Case. 
Defendants claim that they are entitled to trebled damages under UCA § 78-36-3 et. 
seq. The unlawful detainer statutes however do not apply to the Plaintiff in this case. 
By its express language the statute applies only to unlawful detainer "by a tenant for 
a term less than life." The Plaintiffs in this action are not now nor have they ever been tenants of 
the property in question. 
It is one of the most well defined principles of statutory construction that a statute is 
to be construed according to its plain language. The plain language of the statute here makes it 
applicable only to tenants of real property. Under no stretch of the imagination could the Plaintiffs 
in this action be considered tenants and therefore the statute is inapplicable and Defendants are not 
entitled to trebled damages. 
B. Even If Plaintiffs Were Tenants, They Would Not Be an Unlawful Detainer. 
If by some stretch of the imagination the Plaintiffs could be termed as tenants they 
still would not be in unlawful detainer. Utah Code Annotated § 78-36-9 provides: 
2 
On the trial of any proceedings for any forcible entry or forcible detainer the Plaintiffs shall 
only be required to show in addition to the forcible entry or forcible detainer complained of, 
that he was peaceably in the actual possession at the time of the forcible entry, or was 
entitled to the possession att he time of the forcible detainer. The Defendant may show in his 
defense that he or his ancestors or those whose interests in such premises he claims, had been 
in the quiet possession thereof for the space of one whole year continuously next before the 
commencement of the proceedings, and that his interest therein has not been ended or 
determined; and such showing is a bar to the proceedings. 
The undisputed facts at the time of the trial show that Plaintiffs have been in 
possession for much longer than one year prior to the commencement of these proceedings. The 
courts finding that the Plaintiff has a right to equitable redemption clearly is a finding that the 
interest of the Plaintiff had not yet been determined and has not yet ended. Under these 
circumstances it is the Plaintiffs and not the Defendants who have prevailed on this issue and it is 
the Plaintiffs and not the Defendants who is entitled to their attorneys fees in having had to defend 
the same. 
C. The Court Has Not Found an Unlawful Detainer. 
In the Memorandum Decision of the Court, there has been no finding that an unlawful 
detainer on the part of the Plaintiff. 
In light of the fact that there has been no finding of an unlawful detainer the 
Defendants are not entitled to trebled damages which are solely based on such a conclusion of law. 
Accordingly the request for trebled damages must be denied. 
3 
- 1 . . 1 
H. THE DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE REQUESTED ATTORNEY FEES. 
Plaintiffs are the prevailing parties in this action. It was Plaintiffs who claimed they were 
entitled to possession of the property pursuant to the doctrine of equitable redemption and it was the 
defendants who opposed that. There is no contract between the parties and there is no statute which 
provides for the awarding of attorneys fees to the Defendants in this action. 
There are two purported bases for the potential award of attorneys fees in this action. One 
would be the unlawful detainer statute which, as shown above, either does not apply or under which 
the Plaintiffs are in fact the prevailing party and therefore Defendants are not entitled to fees under 
that statute. The secondary potential source for award of attorneys fees would be the doctrine of 
equitable redemption itself The cases for equitable redemption provide that the party seeking to 
redeem should be required to pay the reasonable and necessary expenses of the other party. Those 
expenses can not and should not include the costs of the party opposing the suit itself. The only 
attorneys fees that should be awardable would be those fees incurred in the actual purchase of the 
property. Where, as in this case, the Defendants did not purchase the property at the auction, the 
awardable fees would be those fees which they incurred in acquiring the property from the parties 
who purchased the property at auction. A review of the Affidavit of Steven B. Mitchell discloses that 
there are no attorneys fees that have been charged for that particular item. Accordingly, none of the 
requested attorneys fees should be awarded. 
4 
DATED this day of May, 1998 
LARSON, KIRKHAM & TURNER 
Shawn D. Turner 
SHANGRI DAM 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
?o ^L I hereby certify that on this £ day of May, 1998, I mailed postage prepaid a copy of 
the foregoing document to the following: 
Richard Burbidge, Esq. 
Stephen B. Mitchell, Esq. 
Burbidge & Mitchell 
139 E. South Temple, Suite 2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1103 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CRESTWOOD COVE APARTMENTS 
BUSINESS TRUST, dba COTTONWOOD : 
CREEK APARTMENTS and SHANGRI LA 
UBO, : AFFIDAVIT OF STANLEY L. WADE 
vs. : Case No. 020911135 
SHAWN TURNER and LARSEN 
KIRKHAM& TURNER 
: Judge: Robin W. Reese 
Defendants 
After having been duly sworn, Stanley L. Wade hereby deposes and says: 
1. At all material times, he was involved with and knowledgeable about events occurring in 
and about the Shangri La Apartments property and is able to state the following from his 
own personal knowledge. 
2. After the Court entered its judgment in the matter of Shangri-La Garden Apartments vs 
UAW Properties et. al. on or about July 29, 1998, Plaintiffs were unable to raise the 
nearly $1,000,000 redemption fee and Defendants took possession of the Shangri La 
Apartment complex during about December 1998 and installed their own managers. 
3. Defendants and their agents did not screen new tenants effectively and allowed a lower 
1 
quality of tenants to begin to occupy apartments at Shangri La. Defendants and their 
agents did not effectively manage the apartments. The result of this being that the tenants 
began to damage the apartments and did not dependably pay rent as they were obligated 
to do. The damage done was not repaired in a timely manner and the tenants were not 
held responsible for the damage done. 
4. Defendants took the rent monies and monies generated by the on site coin operated 
washers and dryers and failed to pay the necessary expenses of the apartments thereby 
causing two detrimental results: the premises were not repaired and maintained as 
required; and certain repairs and ongoing expenses were not paid which caused the 
creditors to file liens against the property, all of which were resulting in an ongoing 
diminution of value of the property. 
5. A fire occurred in one of the apartment buildings causing heavy damage to several 
apartments. Fire and resultant water damages occurred to the roof, insulation, ceilings, 
walls, windows, wiring, cabinets and floors of said apartments. Defendants had a partial 
roof repair done to keep weather out, but did not have the remaining damage repaired so 
as to allow re-renting of said apartments and replacement of the cash flow attributable 
thereto. Other than the roof, Defendants did not use the fire insurance proceeds resulting 
from said fire to repair the damaged apartments but took steps to divert said proceeds to 
their own use. 
6. Defendants allowed the carports and fences appurtenant to said apartments to be damaged 
2 
without attempting to identify and impose responsibility on the parties causing the 
damage and without repairing the damage. 
Approximately 18 months after having filed an appeal from the outcome at trial, and 
having observed the deterioration of the property and attendant diminution in value 
during the time the apartment property was in the hands of U.A.W. Properties, L.C. and 
DLM Investments, L.L.C., the matter was discussed with counsel. Said counsel indicated 
that the matter may not be scheduled for hearing by the Supreme Court for two or more 
years. Therefore, pursuant to advise of counsel, and to avoid further damage and 
diminution in value, Affiant deemed it to be a business necessity to negotiate a settlement 
agreement with U.A.W. Properties, L.C. and DLM Investments, L.L.C. in order to be able 
to end the progressive deterioration of the property. Said Settlement resulted in Plaintiffs 
again taking possession of the apartments and to be able to begin to repair and rehabilitate 
the premises and turn around a stream of events that had been resulting in a constant 
diminution of value thereof. 
Dated this ZZ_ day of (3~&Z$~< 2003. 
Stanley L 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO AyofKMM>03. 
IpfLj^A 
D. Kendall Perkins 
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